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In multi-hop wireless network (MWN), the mobile nodes relay others’ packets for 
enabling new applications and enhancing the network deployment and performance. 
However, the selfish nodes drop the packets because packet relay consumes their resources 
without benefits, and the malicious nodes drop the packets to launch Denial-of-Service 
attacks. Packet drop attacks adversely degrade the network fairness and performance in terms 
of throughput, delay, and packet delivery ratio. Moreover, due to the nature of wireless 
transmission and multi-hop packet relay, the attackers can analyze the network traffic in 
undetectable way to learn the users’ locations in number of hops and their communication 
activities causing a serious threat to the users’ privacy. In this thesis, we propose efficient 
security protocols for thwarting packet drop attacks and preserving users’ privacy in multi-
hop wireless networks.  
First, we design a fair and efficient cooperation incentive protocol to stimulate the 
selfish nodes to relay others’ packets. The source and the destination nodes pay credits (or 
micropayment) to the intermediate nodes for relaying their packets. In addition to 
cooperation stimulation, the incentive protocol enforces fairness by rewarding credits to 
compensate the nodes for the consumed resources in relaying others’ packets. The protocol 
also discourages launching Resource-Exhaustion attacks by sending bogus packets to exhaust 
the intermediate nodes’ resources because the nodes pay for relaying their packets.  
For fair charging policy, both the source and the destination nodes are charged when the 
two nodes benefit from the communication. Since micropayment protocols have been 
originally proposed for web-based applications, we propose a practical payment model 
specifically designed for MWNs to consider the significant differences between web-based 
applications and cooperation stimulation. Although the non-repudiation property of the 
public-key cryptography is essential for securing the incentive protocol, the public-key 
cryptography requires too complicated computations and has a long signature tag. For 
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efficient implementation, we use the public-key cryptography only for the first packet in a 
series and use the efficient hashing operations for the next packets, so that the overhead of 
the packet series converges to that of the hashing operations. Since a trusted party is not 
involved in the communication sessions, the nodes usually submit undeniable digital receipts 
(proofs of packet relay) to a centralized trusted party for updating their credit accounts. 
Instead of submitting large-size payment receipts, the nodes submit brief reports containing 
the alleged charges and rewards and store undeniable security evidences. The payment of the 
fair reports can be cleared with almost no processing overhead. For the cheating reports, the 
evidences are requested to identify and evict the cheating nodes. Since the cheating actions 
are exceptional, the proposed protocol can significantly reduce the required bandwidth and 
energy for submitting the payment data and clear the payment with almost no processing 
overhead while achieving the same security strength as the receipt-based protocols.  
Second, the payment reports are processed to extract financial information to reward the 
cooperative nodes, and contextual information such as the broken links to build up a trust 
system to measure the nodes’ packet-relay success ratios in terms of trust values. A node’s 
trust value is degraded whenever it does not relay a packet and improved whenever it does. A 
node is identified as malicious and excluded from the network once its trust value reaches to 
a threshold. Using trust system is necessary to keep track of the nodes’ long-term behaviors 
because the network packets may be dropped normally, e.g., due to mobility, or temporarily, 
e.g., due to network congestion, but the high frequency of packet drop is an obvious 
misbehavior. Then, we propose a trust-based and energy-aware routing protocol to route 
traffics through the highly trusted nodes having sufficient residual energy in order to 
establish stable routes and thus minimize the probability of route breakage. A node’s trust 
value is a real and live measurement to the node’s failure probability and mobility level, i.e., 
the low-mobility nodes having large hardware resources can perform packet relay more 
efficiently. In this way, the proposed protocol stimulates the nodes not only to cooperate but 
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also to improve their packet-relay success ratio and tell the truth about their residual energy 
to improve their trust values and thus raise their chances to participate in future routes. 
Finally, we propose a privacy-preserving routing and incentive protocol for hybrid ad 
hoc wireless network. Micropayment is used to stimulate the nodes’ cooperation without 
submitting payment receipts. We only use the lightweight hashing and symmetric-key-
cryptography operations to preserve the users’ privacy. The nodes’ pseudonyms are 
efficiently computed using hashing operations. Only trusted parties can link these 
pseudonyms to the real identities for charging and rewarding operations. Moreover, our 
protocol protects the location privacy of the anonymous source and destination nodes.  
Extensive analysis and simulations demonstrate that our protocols can secure the 
payment and trust calculation, preserve the users’ privacy with acceptable overhead, and 
precisely identify the malicious and the cheating nodes. Moreover, the simulation and 
measurement results demonstrate that our routing protocols can significantly improve route 
stability and thus the packet delivery ratio due to stimulating the selfish nodes’ cooperation, 
evicting the malicious nodes, and making informed decisions regarding route selection. In 
addition, the processing and submitting overheads of the payment-reports are incomparable 
with those of the receipts in the receipt-based incentive protocols. Our protocol also requires 
incomparable overhead to the signature-based protocols because the lightweight hashing 
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Multi-hop wireless networks (MWNs) such as mobile ad-hoc, vehicular ad-hoc, multi-
hop cellular, and wireless mesh networks [1-7] have been emerging for enabling new 
applications and enhancing the network performance and deployment [8-13]. In MWNs, the 
mobile nodes usually act as routers to relay others’ traffic to the destination. The network 
nodes commit bandwidth, data storage, CPU cycles, battery power, etc, forming a pool of 
resources that can be shared by all of them. The utility that the nodes can obtain from the 
pooled resources is much higher than that they can obtain on their own. Multi-hop packet 
relay can extend the communication range using limited transmit power because packets are 
transmitted over shorter distances. It also can improve the area spectral efficiency and the 
network throughput and capacity [6], [13]. Moreover, MWNs can be deployed more readily 
and at low cost in developing and rural areas. However, due to the nature of wireless 
transmission and multi-hop packet relay, MWNs are vulnerable to serious security challenges 
that endanger their practical implementation. 
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1.1  Security Challenges 
The assumption that the network nodes are willing to relay others’ packets is reasonable 
for disaster recovery or military applications because the nodes belong to a single authority 
and pursue a common goal. However, it may not hold for civilian applications where the 
nodes are autonomous and self-interested in the sense that they aim to maximize their welfare 
and minimize their contributions. Although the proper network operation requires the nodes 
to collaborate, collaboration consumes their valuable resources such as energy and 
computing power and does not provide direct benefits, which stimulates the nodes to behave 
selfishly. The selfish nodes (or the rational packet droppers) will not be voluntarily interested 
in cooperation without sufficient incentive and make use of the cooperative nodes to relay 
their packets, which has negative effect on the network fairness and performance. The 
fairness issue arises when the selfish nodes take advantage of the cooperative nodes without 
any contribution to them, and the cooperative nodes are unfairly overloaded because the 
network traffic is concentrated through them. The selfish behavior also degrades the network 
performance significantly, which may result in failure of the multi-hop communication [14, 
15].  
Moreover, the malicious nodes (or the irrational packet droppers) launch DoS (Denial-
of-Service) attacks by actively involving themselves in communication sessions and 
dropping the packets to break the sessions intentionally to adversely degrade the network 
fairness and performance in terms of throughput, delay, and packet delivery ratio. The 
malicious nodes may be compromised nodes or malfunctioned nodes having faulty hardware 
or software. In addition, due to the nature of wireless transmission and multi-hop packet 
relay, the attackers can analyze the network traffic to learn the users’ communication 
activities and locations causing a serious threat for the users’ privacy. The attackers may also 
trace the network packets backward or forward to identify the source and the destination 
nodes. The attackers may locate the users in number of hops and track their movements. In a 
destructive attack, the attackers eavesdrop the traffic to identify the network topology to 
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detect critical network nodes and then launch directed attacks on them to degrade the 
network connectivity. The privacy violation attacks can be launched in undetectable way 
when the attackers just overhear the transmission around them without disturbing the 
communication or altering the packets.  
Reputation-based mechanisms and incentive protocols [16-20] have been proposed to 
protect against packet drop by enforcing and stimulating the nodes’ cooperation, 
respectively. For reputation-based mechanisms, each node usually monitors the transmissions 
of its neighbors to make sure that the neighbors relay others’ traffics and thus the 
uncooperative nodes (malicious or selfish) can be identified and punished. Each node 
maintains a reputation value for each neighbor. A neighbor’s reputation value is improved 
when the neighbor relays a packet and degraded when the neighbor drops a packet. Once a 
neighbor’s reputation reaches a threshold, the neighbor is identifies as uncooperative. For 
incentive protocols, relaying other nodes’ packets is a service not an obligation, and thus the 
source and the destination nodes pay credits (or micropayment) to the intermediate nodes for 
relaying their packets. In other words, credits are used to motivate the nodes to collaborate by 
making cooperation more beneficial than behaving selfishly.  
However, the reputation-based mechanisms suffer from essential problems that 
discourage implementing them practically. First, monitoring the nodes’ transmissions by 
overhearing the channel is not energy-efficient for transmitters. The full power transmission 
is used instead of adapting the transmission power according to the distance separating the 
transmitter and the receiver to enable more neighboring nodes to overhear the packet 
transmission [21]. Furthermore, the directional antennas [22] that can improve the network 
capacity due to reducing the interference area make monitoring difficult. Second, the 
reputation-based mechanisms cannot achieve fairness because they do not compensate the 
nodes for the consumed resources in relaying others’ packets, and force the nodes to serve 
the network without any benefits and punish them when they do not cooperate no matter how 
they have previously contributed to the network. For example, although the nodes situated at 
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the network center relay much more packets than those at the periphery, they are not 
compensated. Third, these mechanisms suffer from unreliable detection of the selfish nodes 
and false accusation of the honest nodes. The reputation-based mechanisms should observe a 
node’s behavior over long time and different sessions to differentiate between the node’s 
unwillingness and incapability to cooperate because packet drop may just happen accidently, 
e.g., due to low resources, bad channel, and network congestion, but the mechanisms may not 
have sufficient time to judge a node’s behavior precisely due to the node mobility. Moreover, 
the assumption that the transmitted packets by a node can be received by all the nodes in its 
neighborhood cannot be ensured, e.g., due to packet collision [23]. Finally, reputation-based 
mechanisms have not considered the possibility that selfish nodes can collude with each 
other to boost their reputations to maximize their welfare.  
In addition to cooperation stimulation, incentive protocols can achieve fairness by 
charging and rewarding credits to balance a node’s contributions and benefits. A node’s 
contribution can be relaying other nodes’ packets or paying credits, whereas a node’s benefit 
can be relaying its packets or earning credits. Moreover, since the nodes pay for relaying 
their packets, incentive protocols can discourage Resource-Exhaustion attacks where the 
attackers exchange spurious messages to exhaust the intermediate nodes’ resources. Incentive 
protocols can also be used for charging the future services of the mobile networks because 
the communication sessions may occur without involving an infrastructure and the mobile 
nodes may roam among different foreign networks [24], [25], i.e., a mobile node can pay 
different network operators without contacting a distant home location register.  
1.2  Motivations 
The efficient implementation of the existing incentive protocols is highly questionable 
because they impose significant overhead. First, a fair charging policy is to charge both the 
source and the destination nodes when both of them benefit from the communication. To 
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securely implement this charging policy, two signatures are usually required per message 
(one from the source node and the other from the destination node) to prevent payment 
repudiation and manipulation. However, the extensive use of the public key cryptography 
requires too complicated computations to be used efficiently in limited-resource nodes, and 
the secure public-key cryptosystems usually have long signature tags, which degrades the 
network performance and stimulates the nodes to behave selfishly.  
Second, since the communication sessions may occur without involving a trusted party, 
the nodes usually compose undeniable proof of packet relay, called receipts, and submit the 
receipts to a trusted party (Tp) to claim the payment. A conclusive point for the practical 
implementation of the incentive protocols is the receipts’ submission and process overhead 
due to the high frequency of low-value payment transactions. In other words, submitting a 
large number of receipts implies significant communication and processing overhead, and 
implementation difficulty because the cost of the receipts’ submission and process may 
exceed the transaction value. Reducing the receipts’ number is essential for the practical 
implementation of an incentive protocol to avoid making bottleneck at the Tp, and to reduce 
the storage, submission, and processing overheads. The large-size receipts consume the 
nodes’ resources in submitting them and large processing overhead is required to clear the 
payment.  
Third, most of the existing incentive protocols use payment models that have been 
designed for the Web-based micropayment applications. In order to efficiently implement 
micropayment in multi-hop wireless networks, the payment model should consider the 
differences between the Web-based applications and cooperation stimulation. 
Fourth, the incentive protocols assume that the nodes are rational packet droppers in the 
sense that they relay the network packets when they can achieve more benefits than dropping 
the packets. This assumption cannot be guaranteed in MWNs because unlike the single-hop 
networks that are run by the operators’ equipments, packet routing is performed by the user 
provided equipment. Some attackers may launch DoS attacks by dropping the packets to 
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disrupt the network proper operation without caring about their interests. A broken node may 
have a software or hardware fault that prevents it from relaying the packets. In IP networks, 
the malfunction of the network equipment is an important source for the network 
unavailability [26]. Moreover, the nodes loaded with low hardware resources may act as 
irrational packet droppers because they lack the CPU cycles or the buffer space to relay the 
packets. In Chapter 7, we will show that a low ratio of the irrational packet droppers can 
significantly degrade the packet delivery ratio. 
Fifth, route stability is essential for high-performance MWNs and reliable data 
transmission. Frequent route failures adversely affect the network performance in terms of 
throughput and delay. The presence of even a small number of misbehaving nodes could 
result in repeatedly broken routes and thus the network nodes have to rely on cycles of time-
out and route discoveries to communicate. These new route discoveries incur network-wide 
flooding of routing requests which consumes the network resources such as batteries’ energy 
and bandwidth. However, thwarting selfish and malicious nodes is not sufficient for route 
stability that requires establishing the routes through the highly trusted nodes having 
sufficient energy for packet relay. This is because the network nodes may possess different 
hardware capabilities in terms of CPU cycles and buffer size and thus the high-hardware-
resource nodes having sufficient energy are more capable of performing packet relay.  
Finally, in the existing incentive protocols, each node has to use a unique identity in its 
lifetime for charging and rewarding operations, which jeopardizes the users’ privacy. 
Moreover, the existing privacy-preserving routing protocols heavily depend on packet 
broadcasting and public key cryptography, which makes these protocols infeasible for 
MWNs due to the constraints on the nodes’ resources. 
1.3  Contributions 
In this thesis, we propose efficient security protocols for thwarting packet drop attacks 
and preserving users’ privacy in MWNs. First, we develop a payment model that takes into 
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account the features of cooperation stimulation in order to improve the practical 
implementation of the micropayment in MWNs. Second, based on this payment model, we 
propose a fair, efficient and secure cooperation incentive protocol to stimulate the selfish 
nodes’ cooperation in MWNs. For fair charging policy, both the source and the destination 
nodes are charged when the two nodes benefit from the communication. For efficient 
implementation, our protocol uses the public-key cryptography only for the first packet in a 
series and uses the efficient hashing operations for the next packets, so that the overhead of 
the packet series converges to the lightweight overhead of the hashing operations. As we will 
discuss in details in Chapter 7, the overhead cost of the hashing operations in terms of 
computational time and energy is incomparable to those of the signing and verifying 
operations.  
Furthermore, instead of generating and submitting a large-size payment receipt per 
message, each node submits a brief payment report containing its alleged rewards and 
charges for different sessions and stores undeniable security evidences. We propose a 
mechanism for investigating the reports’ credibility. The payment of the fair reports can be 
cleared with almost no processing overhead. For the cheating reports, the evidences are 
requested to identify and evict the cheating nodes that report incorrect payment data. Since 
the cheating actions are exceptional, the proposed incentive protocol can significantly reduce 
the required bandwidth and energy for submitting the payment data and clear the payment 
with almost no processing overhead while achieving the same security strength as the 
receipt-based protocols. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed incentive protocol is the 
first proposal that mainly relies on the efficient hashing operations and the first payment-
report based (instead of receipt-based) incentive protocol for MWNs.  
Thirdly, we propose a trust/reputation system to evaluate the nodes’ packet-relay 
success ratios in terms of trust/reputation values by processing the payment reports. The 
reports can be processed to extract financial information to reward the intermediate nodes 
and charge the source and destination nodes, and contextual information such as the broken 
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links to build up a trust/reputation system to measure the nodes’ packet-relay success ratios 
in terms of trust/reputation values. The system depends on the following fact: if a message is 
received by node IDi, this means that all the nodes from the source to IDi-1 have successfully 
relayed the message. A node's trust/reputation value is degraded whenever the node drops a 
message and improved whenever the node relays a message. Once a node’s reputation value 
reaches to a threshold, the node is identified as malicious and excluded from the network. 
Using trust/reputation system is necessary to keep track of the nodes’ long-term behaviors 
because the network packets may be dropped normally, e.g., due to mobility, or temporarily, 
e.g., due to the network congestion, but the high frequency of packet drop is an obvious 
misbehavior. In our protocol, un-cooperation will not be abused because the nodes are 
stimulated not forced to cooperate, but frequently breaking the communication sessions is an 
obvious abuse due to disrupting the routing process. In this way, our protocol uses credits to 
stimulate the selfish nodes (or rational packet droppers) to cooperate, and reputation values to 
force the malicious nodes to behave rationally to avoid eviction. To the best of our 
knowledge, our proposal is the first protocol that can both stimulate the selfish nodes’ 
cooperation and identify the malicious nodes.  
Fourthly, the used threshold to identify the malicious nodes should be tolerant to reduce 
the negative positive ratio and thus the nodes having medium or relatively low trust values 
may be considered as honest nodes. The honest nodes may have different packet-relay 
success ratios because they have different hardware capabilities and mobility levels. A 
node’s trust value is a real and live measurement to the node’s failure probability and 
mobility level, i.e., the low mobility nodes having large hardware resources can perform 
packet relay more efficiently. Therefore, we propose a trust-based and energy-aware routing 
protocol to route the traffic through the highly trusted nodes having sufficient residual energy 
in order to minimize the probability of route breakage and maximize route stability, which 
can significantly improve the network performance in terms of packet delay, throughput, and 
packet delivery ratio. In other words, the routing protocol selects the nodes that performed 
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packet relay more successfully in the past and have sufficient energy to relay the session 
messages. In this way, the protocol stimulates the nodes not only to cooperate but also to 
improve their packet-relay success ratios and tell the truth about their residual energy to raise 
their chances to participate in future routes. To the best of our knowledge, this protocol is the 
first protocol that can both stimulate the nodes’ cooperation and make informed routing 
decisions based on the nodes’ past behavior and residual energy to maximize the packet 
delivery probability. 
Fifthly, we propose an efficient privacy-preserving routing and incentive protocol for 
hybrid ad hoc wireless network. Micropayment is used to foster the nodes’ cooperation 
without submitting payment receipts. The protocol uses only the lightweight hashing and 
symmetric-key-cryptography operations to preserve the users’ privacy. Users’ anonymity can 
be achieved by using pseudonyms instead of the real identities. The nodes’ pseudonyms are 
efficiently computed using hashing operations. Only trusted parties can link these 
pseudonyms to the real identities for charging and rewarding operations. Moreover, the 
proposed protocol protects the location privacy of the anonymous source and destination 
nodes. To the best of our knowledge, this proposal is the first protocol that addresses both 
cooperation stimulation and user privacy for hybrid ad hoc networks.  
Extensive security analysis and simulation results demonstrate that our protocols can 
secure the payment and trust calculation, and precisely identify and evict the malicious and 
the cheating nodes. The proposed protocol can provide high protection level for the users’ 
privacy, i.e., any transmission in the network cannot be traced to an individual's real identity 
and cannot be used to identify the users’ locations. 
Moreover, our performance evaluations and simulation results demonstrate that our 
protocols can clear the payment with almost no processing overhead and the submission 
overhead of the payment-reports are incomparable with that of the receipts in the receipt-
based incentive protocols. Our incentive protocol also requires incomparable overhead to the 
signature-based protocols because the lightweight hashing operations dominate the nodes’ 
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operations. The simulation results demonstrate that the proposed incentive protocol requires 
less than 10% of the computation time and energy for a series of 13 packets, and  the packet 
overhead is 66% of that of the DSA-based incentive protocol with a probability of 0.95. In 
addition, the simulation results demonstrate that the trust-based and energy-aware routing 
protocol can significantly improve the routes’ stability and thus the packet delivery ratio 
compared to the shortest-path routing protocols due to stimulating the selfish nodes’ 
cooperation, evicting the malicious nodes, and making informed decisions regarding the 
route selection.  
1.4  Outline of This Thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. 
Chapter 2 reviews the related work including the reputation-based mechanisms, 
incentive protocols, and privacy-preserving protocols. We summarize the mechanisms and 
the protocols and discuss their characteristics, weaknesses, and strengths.  
In Chapter 3, we present the system models including the network and communication 
model, the threat and trust model, and the payment model.  
The proposed incentive protocol and the proposed trust-based and energy-aware routing 
protocol are presented in Chapter 4. In this chapter, we will discuss how the payment reports 
are processed to calculate the nodes’ trust values. We also will discuss how the malicious 
nodes can be identified. Finally, we will discuss how the traffic is directed to the highly 
trusted nodes having sufficient energy.  
In Chapter 5, we propose a privacy-preserving routing and incentive protocol for hybrid 
ad hoc network. Security analysis and performance evaluations are provided in Chapter 6 and 







Chapter 2                                       
Related Work 
2.1  Incentive Protocols 
The existing incentive protocols can be classified into two categories: tamper-proof-
device (TPD) and central-bank based protocols. For TPD-based incentive protocols [27-32], 
a tamper-proof device is installed in each node to store and manage its credit account and 
secure its operation. In central-bank based incentive protocols [33-42], a centralized unit, 
such as Tp, stores and manages the nodes’ accounts.  
In Nuglets [27, 28], the self-generated and forwarding packets are passed to the node’s 
TPD to decrease and increase its credit account, respectively. Two payment models, called 
the packet purse model (PPM) and the packet trade model (PTM), have been proposed. In the 
PPM, the source node pays for relaying its packets by loading some credits in each packet 
before sending it. Each intermediate node acquires the amount of credits that cover the 
packet’s forwarding cost, and the packet is dropped if it runs out of credits. In the PTM, each 
intermediate node runs an auction to sell the packets to the following node in the route. In 
this way, each intermediate node earns some credits and the destination node pays the total 
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packet relay cost. In SIP [29], after receiving a packet, the destination node sends a payment 
RECEIPT packet to the source node to issue a REWARD packet to increment the 
intermediate nodes’ credit accounts. Each message requires three packets between the source 
and the destination nodes. In CASHnet [30], [31], for each transmitted packet, the source 
node’s traffic-credit account stored in the node is charged and signature is attached. Upon 
receiving the packet, the destination node’s traffic-credit account is also charged and a 
digitally signed ACK packet is sent back to increase the helper-credit accounts of the 
intermediate nodes. Users regularly visit service points to buy traffic credits with real money 
and/or convert helper credits to traffic credits. The extensive use of the digital-signature 
operations in both the data and ACK packets is not efficient for the limited-resource nodes. It 
is shown in [32] that in spite of having helper credits, some nodes starve because they cannot 
find a service point to convert them to traffic credits.  
Centralized-bank based incentive protocols can be classified into electronic-coin and 
receipt based protocols. For electronic-coin-based incentive protocols [33], each node buys 
electronic coins from Tp before being involved in a session to pay for relaying its messages. 
In receipt-based incentive protocols [34-42], the nodes compose undeniable payment receipts 
(proofs of packet relay) that contain the identities of the payers and the payees, and the 
payment amount. Since the connection to Tp may not be available on regular basis, the nodes 
accumulate the receipts and submit them in batch to Tp to update their accounts.  
In [33], each node in a session buys packets from the previous node and sells them to 
the next node. The packets’ buyer and seller contact Tp to get deposited coins and submit the 
coins to claim the payment, respectively. However, the interactive involvement of Tp in each 
communication session creates a bottleneck at Tp and causes high latency. In Sprite [34], the 
source node signs a message and the identities of the nodes in the route and appends its 
signature to the data packet. The intermediate and destination nodes verify the signature and 
compose a receipt per message and submit the receipts to Tp to claim the payment. In 
Express [35], the source node generates a hash chain for each intermediate node IDK and 
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commits to the hash chain by digitally signing the root of the hash chain and sending the 
signature to IDK. Each time IDK relays a packet, the source node releases the pre-image of 
the last sent hash value. The source, intermediate, and destination nodes compose receipts 
and submit them to Tp. However, the nodes have to generate and store a large number of 
hash chains because any node in the network may act as an intermediate node due to the node 
mobility. The packet overhead is large especially if the number of intermediate nodes is large 
because the source node attaches one hash value for each intermediate node. In Sprite, 
Express, and INPAC [36], only the source node pays no matter how the destination node 
benefits from the communication. Moreover, since each intermediate node is rewarded for 
every relayed message even if it does not reach the destination, all the nodes in a session 
have to submit the receipts because packet relay is considered successful by a node if its next 
node in the session reports a valid receipt. The receipts overwhelm the network because of 
generating and submitting a large number of receipts, which consumes the nodes’ storage and 
energy resources and the network bandwidth, and requires a massive processing overhead to 
clear the receipts.   
The proposed protocol in [37] reduces the receipts’ number by rewarding the nodes 
probabilistically. The source node appends a payment token to each packet, and the 
intermediate nodes check whether the tokens correspond to winning tickets that are submitted 
to Tp. The source and the destination nodes are charged per packet but the intermediate 
nodes are rewarded per winning ticket. However, the fairness issue arises when the nodes’ 
rewards are not proportional to the number of packets they relay, and the colluding nodes can 
intercept and exchange tokens to be checked locally in each node to steal. In CDS [38], 
instead of submitting payment receipts to Tp, each node submits a smaller-size activity report 
containing its alleged charges and rewards for different sessions. Tp uses statistical methods 
to identify the cheating nodes that submit incorrect reports by measuring how frequency the 
nodes’ reports are inconsistent with others. However, due to the nature of the statistical 
methods, some honest nodes may be falsely identified as cheaters and colluding nodes may 
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manage to steal credits. Moreover, credit clearance may be delayed for a long time until 
identifying the cheating nodes. In [39], Salem et al. have proposed an incentive protocol for 
hybrid ad hoc network. When a route is broken, the nodes that received the message submit 
receipts to the base station to secure the payment. Unlike this work, our protocol presented in 
Chapter 5 can preserve the users’ privacy and eliminate the need for submitting receipts. 
In [40], an incentive protocol has been proposed for ad hoc network that is used as an 
access network to connect the nodes to the Internet. For each message, the source node 
appends a signature to the identities of the nodes in the route, and the destination node signs a 
receipt and sends it to the last intermediate node to submit to Tp. Since a receipt contains 
payment data for all the intermediate nodes, one copy of the receipt is submitted to claim the 
payment for all the intermediate nodes. However, generating two signatures per message is 
resource consuming for the mobile nodes. Moreover, the source and the destination nodes 
can communicate freely and the intermediate nodes are not rewarded if the last intermediate 
node colludes with the source and the destination nodes so as not to submit the receipts. 
Figure 2.1 shows the charges and rewards for relaying X messages in a session with n 
intermediate nodes assuming λ credits are paid per message and the source and destination 
nodes are charged the ratios Pr and (1-Pr) of the total payment, respectively. If the source and 
destination nodes collude with the last intermediate node and the receipt is not submitted, the 
colluders can save X ⋅ λ ⋅ (n-1) credits, and thus the source and destination nodes can 
compensate the colluding intermediate node. On the other hand, it is not efficient to submit a 
receipt by each intermediate node [34], [35], [36], due to significantly increasing the 
redundant receipts’ number.  
 
 
Figure  2.1: The charges and rewards for relaying X messages. 
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In PIS [41], the source node attaches a signature to each message and the destination node 
replies with a signed ACK. PIS can reduce the receipts’ overhead and charge the source and 
the destination nodes when both of them benefit from the communication. A fixed-size 
receipt is generated per route regardless of the messages’ number. Instead of submitting the 
receipts by all the intermediate nodes, a reactive and preventive receipt submission schemes 
have been proposed in PIS [41] and DSC [42], respectively to reduce the number of 
submitted receipts and protect against collusion attacks. In the reactive scheme [41], the first 
intermediate node after the source has to submit the receipt and the other intermediate nodes 
submit the receipt with very low probability to thwart the receipt-submission collusion 
attacks with submitting few additional receipts and limiting the number of un-submitted 
receipts probabilistically. Unlike the reactive receipt submission scheme that aims to identify 
and evict the colluding nodes, the preventive receipt submission scheme [42] aims to fail the 
collusion attack. In this scheme, each intermediate node submits a randomly chosen ratio of 
the receipts to guarantee submitting the receipts probabilistically even if some intermediate 
nodes collude with the source and destination nodes. Unlike PIS that requires two signatures 
for each message (one from the source node and the other from destination node), DSC can 
reduce the public-key-cryptography operations by replacing the destination node’s signature 
with the hashing operations. The destination node generates a hash chain by iteratively 
hashing a random value to obtain the hash chain root. The destination node signs the hash 
chain root, and releases one hash value from the chain in each ACK packet.    
2.2  Reputation-based Mechanisms 
The reputation-based mechanisms use reputation systems to differentiate between the 
cooperative nodes that drop the packets normally, e.g., due to mobility and bad channel, and 
the uncooperative nodes that drop the packets intentionally. The reputation system sets and 
updates a reputation value for each node. A node’s reputation is improved when it relays 
packets successfully, but the reputation is degraded when the node drops packets. Once a 
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node’s reputation degrades to a threshold, the node is identified as uncooperative and 
punished. 
In [14], two modules called watchdog and path-rater are implemented in each node. 
When node ID1 transmits a packet to ID2 to relay to ID3, the watchdog module of ID1 
overhears the medium to make sure that ID2 relays the packet. ID1 increases the reputation of 
ID2 when it overhears the packet transmission; otherwise, ID1 decreases the reputation of 
ID2. ID1 accuses ID2 of un-cooperation as soon as its reputation degrades beyond a threshold. 
Based on the watchdog’s accusations, the path-rater module chooses the path that avoids the 
uncooperative nodes without punishing them, which imposes extra load on the cooperative 
nodes without any benefits. In OCEAN [43], a node’s reputation is initialized to neutral (0), 
every positive behavior (relaying a packet) results in an increment (+1), and every negative 
behavior (dropping a packet) results in a decrement (−2). Once a node’s reputation falls 
below a threshold (−40), the node is identified as uncooperative. However, in [14] and [43], 
the nodes depend only on their observations to evaluate a node’s behavior and they do not 
share their evaluations, which may degrade the mechanism’s effectiveness because the 
cooperative nodes that drop the packets temporarily due to the network congestion or other 
reasons may be falsely identified as uncooperative.  
CONFIDANT [44] prefers the good-reputation nodes in route selection, which imposes 
more burdens on these nodes without immediate benefits. For CONFIDANT and CORE [45], 
each node combines its evaluation with other nodes’ evaluations to calculate a node’s 
reputation value. Only the positive evaluations are propagated in CORE to prevent defaming 
the nodes’ reputations by propagating false negative evaluations, but only the negative 
evaluations are propagated in CONFIDANT to prevent the colluders from falsely boosting 
their reputations by propagating false positive evaluations. However, in order to precisely 
judge a node’s real behavior, both the negative and the positive behaviors should be 
considered. A node’s reputation is decremented along the time in CORE when the node does 
not relay packets, which is not fair for the nodes that reside at the network edge because they 
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are less frequently selected by the routing protocol. In CORE and CONFIDANT, the 
uncooperative nodes are excluded from the network by avoiding them in routing and denying 
them cooperation. Nevertheless, the isolation of the uncooperative nodes is performed 
unilaterally, which may result in false accusations because when a node IDi denies relaying 
the uncooperative nodes’ packets, the neighbors of IDi may consider its behavior illegal.  
In SORI [46], each node counts the packets relayed both by and for neighboring node, 
and the ratio of these counts is combined with reports from other nodes to calculate the 
node’s reputation. However, the less frequently selected nodes by the routing protocol such 
as those at the network perimeter have falsely bad reputation. In [47], 2-hop ACK technique 
is used to monitor a node’s behavior instead of using the medium overhearing technique. The 
node ID1 accuses the next node ID2 of dropping the packet, if ID1 does not receive ACK from 
the 2-hop away node ID3, but the mechanism completely fails when two neighboring nodes 
collude to issue fake ACKs. 
In the reputation-based mechanisms, the nodes may relay the packets to avoid 
punishment, but do not monitor their neighbors to save their resources and make use of the 
other nodes’ evaluations to avoid routing their packets through the uncooperative nodes, 
which degrades the mechanism effectiveness. Moreover, the medium overhearing technique 
suffers from inaccuracy problems because the assumption that the transmitted packets by a 
node can be overheard by all the nodes in its neighborhood cannot be ensured for the 
following reasons [14]: (1) When a node ID2 relays a packet to ID3, it is possible that ID1 
cannot overhear the transmission due to another concurrent transmission in ID1’s 
neighborhood [23]; and (2) Since ID1 can know whether ID2 has relayed a packet but not if 
ID3 received it, a misbehaving node ID2 can save its energy and circumvent the monitoring 
technique if ID1 is closer than ID3 by adjusting its transmission power such that the signal is 
strong enough to be overheard by the monitoring node ID1 but too weak to be received by the 
true recipient ID3 [21].  
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2.3  Privacy-Preserving Routing Protocols 
In [48], Capkun et al. have proposed a privacy-preserving communication protocol for 
hybrid ad hoc network. Each node stores a set of public/private key pairs and certificates. 
The certificates have different pseudonyms and signed by Tp to certify the keys. The node 
uses its public/private key pairs to establish symmetric keys shared with its neighbors. It 
frequently changes its pseudonym by changing the public/private key pair and establishing 
new symmetric keys with its neighbors. The authors demonstrate that the sufficient 
frequency of pseudonym change is in the order of 1/min. The data is encrypted with the base 
station’s public key so that the intermediate nodes relaying the data to the base station cannot 
interpret the content. However, the nodes periodically contact Tp to refill their public/private 
key pairs. Generating and distributing a large number of public/private keys with certificates 
is very resource consuming. Since the network nodes have a large number of certificates, 
certificate revocation is a real challenge, and these keys can be used to launch Sybil attacks 
[49]. 
In ANODR [50], the source node attaches a trapdoor to the Route Request Packet 
(RREQ) to anonymously inform the destination node about the session. The trapdoor 
contains the destination node’s real identity and a random value encrypted with a shared key 
with the destination. Each node X tries to open the trapdoor. If it is not the destination, X 
adds a nonce NX and encrypts the packet with a onetime key KX creating onion message 
encrypted by all the intermediate nodes along the route. The destination node adds the onion 
message to the Route Reply Packet (RREP) and broadcasts the packet. The nodes discard the 
packet if they cannot open the onion message using KX and NX, otherwise, they are 
intermediate nodes in the route. However, the trapdoor used in the RREQ packet is not 
practical or scalable because each node has to decrypt the trapdoor with every key it shares 
with other nodes to know if it is the destination. This is because the identities of the source 
and the destination nodes are hidden for anonymity. Moreover, the source and the destination 
nodes cannot establish session keys shared with the intermediate nodes to make a 
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cryptographic onion for the communication data, and thus packet un-likability is 
unachievable. The processing overhead of the RREQ and RREP packets is not negligible 
because they are broadcasted. 
In SDAR [51], the source node attaches a onetime public key and a trapdoor to the 
RREQ packet. The trapdoor contains the destination node’s identity and a onetime session 
key encrypted with the public key of the destination node. Each node tries to open the 
trapdoor with its private key. If it is not the destination, the node adds a nonce as a 
pseudonym, a session key, and onetime public key. The destination node broadcasts the 
RREP packet which contains the pseudonym of the next node in the route, and an onion 
message. Each intermediate node decrypts one layer of the message using the session key 
and broadcasts the packet that contains the pseudonym of the next node in the route. The 
source and the destination nodes create a cryptographic onion for their communication data 
using the session keys they share with the intermediate nodes. However, the protocol is not 
efficient as it requires every node to perform a decryption operation using a private key, an 
encryption operation using a public key, and a signature operation for every RREQ packet it 
forwards. The sizes of the RREQ and the RREP packets are large which consumes much 
energy and bandwidth. The destination node learns the identities of all the nodes in the route. 
The location of the destination node is also disclosed to the source node. In the RREQ packet, 
a malicious intermediate node can delete the last part of the routing information that is 









Chapter 3                                        
System Models 
3.1  Network and Communication Models 
As illustrated in Figure 3.1, the considered multi-hop wireless network includes a 
trusted party (Tp), mobile nodes, and base stations in some types of the MWNs. The base 
stations are connected with each other and with Tp by a backbone network that may be wired 
or wireless. Tp stores and manages the nodes’ credit accounts and trust values, and generates 
private/public key pair and certificate with a unique identity for each node to participate in 
the network. Each node stores a unique identity and public/private key pair with a certificate, 
the public key of Tp, and the required cryptographic data to enable any two nodes to share a 
symmetric key. For efficient implementation, an identity-based key exchange protocol based 
on bilinear pairing can be used because the nodes do not need to exchange messages to 
compute the shared keys. Tp generates a prime p, a cyclic additive group (G), and a cyclic 
multiplicative group (GT) of the same order p such that an efficiently computable bilinear 
pairing ê: G × G → GT is known. The bilinear mapping has the following properties:  
- Bilinear: ê(a · P, b · Q) = ê(b · P, a · Q) = ê(P, Q)
a ⋅ b, for all P, Q ∈ G and a, b ∈ ZP*. 




Figure  3.1: The architecture of the multi-hop wireless network. 
- Symmetric: ê(P, Q) = ê(Q, P), for all P, Q ∈ G. 
- Admissible: there is an efficient algorithm to compute ê(P, Q) for any P, Q ∈ G. 
The bilinear map ê can be implemented efficiently using the Weil and Tate pairings on 
elliptic curves [52]. Tp selects a random element µ ∈ ZP* known as the master key, and 
computes the secret keys for the nodes based on their identities. The secret key for node IDi 
is Ski = µ ·  H(IDi) ∈ G, where H:{0,1}* → G.  
Once Tp receives the payment reports from the nodes, it processes them to update the 
nodes’ credit accounts and trust values. Once Tp detects malicious or cheating nodes, Tp 
revokes the nodes by not renewing their certificates. The source node’s packets may be 
relayed in several hops by the mobile nodes, and the base station(s) whenever it is necessary, 
to the destination node. The network nodes can contact Tp at least once during a time interval 
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called updating time that can be in the range of few days. During this connection, the nodes 
submit the payment reports, renew their certificates, and convert credits to real money and/or 
purchase credits with real money. This connection can occur via the base stations, Wi-Fi 
hotspots, or wired networks such as the Internet. All the communications are unicast and the 
nodes can communicate in one of two modes: pure ad hoc or hybrid. For pure ad hoc mode, 
the source and the destination nodes communicate without involving base stations. The 
source node’s messages may be relayed in several hops by the intermediate nodes to the 
destination node. For hybrid mode, at least one base station is involved in the 
communication. The source node transmits its messages to the source base station (Bs), if 
necessary in multiple hops. If the destination node resides in a different cell, the messages are 
forwarded to the destination base station (Bd) that transmits the messages to the destination 
node possibly in multiple hops.  
3.2  Threat and Trust Models 
The mobile nodes and the base stations are probable attackers but Tp is fully secure. The 
mobile nodes and the base stations are motivated to misbehave to increase their welfare 
because the mobile nodes are autonomous and self-interested and the base stations may be 
owned by different providers. It is impossible to realize secure payment between two entities 
without trusted third party [53]. The attackers have full control on their devices and thus they 
can change their operation and infer the cryptographic data. The attackers can be classified 
into two classes: rational attackers and irrational packet droppers. The rational attackers 
misbehave when they can achieve more benefits than behaving honestly. Specifically, they 
attempt to steal credits, pay less, and communicate freely. On the contrary, the irrational 
packet droppers aim to disrupt the packet transmission by involving themselves in sessions 
and dropping the data packets to break the sessions without considering their interests and the 
attack cost such as energy and credits. The irrational packet droppers may launch Black-Hole 
attack by continuously breaking all the sessions they participate in, or launch Gray-Hole 
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attack by intentionally breaking some sessions and behaving regularly in other sessions to 
circumvent Tp but the ratio of the broken sessions should be high to launch effective attacks. 
The irrational packet droppers may be compromised, malfunctioned, or low-hardware-
resource nodes.  
Non-participation in packet relay is not abuse because the nodes are stimulated not 
forced to cooperate, but the high frequency of packet drop is an abuse due to disrupting the 
data transmission process. The attackers may work individually or collude with each other to 
launch sophisticated attacks. The colluding irrational packet droppers may launch two 
attacks: Trust-Boost and False-Accusation attacks. For Trust-Boost attack, the attackers 
attempt to augment their trust and reputation values falsely to escape the consequence of 
dropping the packets; and for False-Accusation attacks, the attackers try to defame the trust 
values of honest nodes to evict them from the network. The gained experience from the 
currently used protocols in civilian applications emphasizes that large-scale irrational 
collusion attacks are highly unlikely [54], [55]. The trust/reputation systems are susceptible 
to the large-scale collusion attacks due to the nature of these systems. Our security objective 
is to protect the payment against large-scale collusion attacks, and to protect the 
trust/reputation system against small-scale irrational collusion attacks launched by low 
number of colluders, e.g., in the range of ten, and improve the system’s robustness against 
large-scale attacks. For the trust models, the nodes fully trust Tp to perform billing and 
auditing and trust calculations, but Tp does not trust any node or base station in the network.  
3.3  Payment Model 
Micropayment schemes [56-58] are electronic payment schemes for frequent and low-
value payments. The schemes were originally designed for the Internet electronic commerce 
applications to take advantage of the high volume of viewers by offering content for low 
price. Examples of these applications include buying data or news, listening to a song, 
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playing an online game, and reading an article in a journal [59]. In order to efficiently 
implement such scheme in MWNs, the payment model should consider the differences 
between web-based applications and cooperation stimulation. These differences are 
summarized in Table 3.1. For web-based applications, a transaction usually contains one 
customer and one merchant, and merchants’ number is low and their identities are known 
before the transaction is held. For cooperation stimulation, each transaction usually contains 
two customers (the source and the destination nodes) and multiple merchants (the 
intermediate nodes), the merchants’ number is large because any node can work as a 
merchant (or packet relay), and the merchants’ identities are known only at the transaction 
(session) time due to the nodes’ mobility. Moreover, the relation between a customer and a 
merchant is usually short due to the network dynamic topology. The nodes are involved in 
low-value transactions very frequently because once a route is broken, which is frequently 
due to the nodes’ mobility and the channel impairment, a new transaction should be held to 
re-establish the route. In wireless networks, the nodes have low resources such as energy and 
storage area, comparing to the computers’ large resources in Web-based applications. 
Although security is important in all payment applications, the attacks can be launched easier 
in Web-based applications because it is easier to launch attacks across the Internet than 
tampering devices. 
Table  3.1: Properties of Web-based applications and cooperation stimulation. 
  Web-based applications Cooperation stimulation 
P1 Transactions’ parties 
One customer and one 
merchant 
One or more merchants and 
two customers 
P2 Merchants’ 
Number Low Large 
Identities Known in advance Unknown in advance 
P3  Customer-merchant relation Long Very short 
P4 Transaction frequency High Very high 
P5 Transaction value Low Very low 
P6 Easiness of misbehavior Very easy Less 
P7 Nodes’ resources High Low 
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3.3.1 Parties and Relations 
The payment model has three basic parties: the customer or the source and the 
destination nodes, the merchant or the intermediate nodes, and the bank or Tp. Figure 3.2 
portrays the relations among the different parties in our payment model. The operations 
among these parties can be divided into three phases: Certificate Issuing, Payment, and 
Redemption. In Certificate Issuing Phase, a customer has to register with the bank to create 
an account, and the bank issues a short-lifetime certificate, e.g., for seven to ten days. The 
customer contacts the bank periodically to renew his certificate and pay for the services 
(packet relay) he received from the merchants. In Payment Phase, the customer’s certificate 
enables him to issue payment evidences to transact with merchants without involving the 
bank, i.e., customers mine their own electronic coins without the need for direct verification 
by the bank. In Redemption Phase, each merchant claims its payment by submitting payment 
reports. Tp clears the fair reports by rewarding the merchants and charging the customers and 
requests the evidences to identify the cheating nodes. This payment architecture has two 
important properties that can improve the practical implementation of micropayment in 
multi-hop wireless networks: No Need for Tamper-Proof-Device and Flexible-Payment. 
 
 
Figure  3.2: The payment model’s parties and relations. 
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A. No Need for Tamper-Proof-Device 
The TPD-based incentive protocols [27-32] may not find widespread acceptance for the 
following reasons. First, the assumption that the TPD cannot be tampered is neither secure 
nor practical for MWNs. That is because the nodes are autonomous and self-interested and 
the attackers can communicate freely in undetectable way if they could compromise the 
TPDs [60]. Moreover, since the security protection of these protocols completely fails if the 
TPDs are tampered, only a small number of manufactures can be trusted to make the network 
nodes, which is too restrictive for civilian networks. Second, a node cannot communicate if it 
does not have sufficient credits at the communication time. Unfortunately, the nodes at the 
network edge cannot earn as many credits as the nodes at other locations because they are 
less frequently selected by the routing protocol. Furthermore, the credit distribution has direct 
impact on the network performance, e.g., if a small number of nodes have large ratio of the 
network credits, the network performance significantly degrades because the rich nodes are 
not motivated to cooperate and the poor nodes cannot initiate communications. Finally, since 
credits are cleared in real-time, the network performance degrades if the network does not 
have enough credits circulating around. In [32], it is shown that the overall credits in the 
network gradually decline because the total charges are not necessarily equal to the total 
rewards. That is because the source node is fully charged after sending a packet but some 
intermediate nodes may not be rewarded when the route is broken. In [29], a compensation 
mechanism is used to change the packet-relaying price proportionally to the nodes’ speed to 
avoid the credit decline. However, the compensation mechanism has to avoid credit inflation 
and depletion. For credit inflation, the nodes are rich and thus unmotivated to cooperation, 
whereas for credit depletion, the nodes are poor and incapable of initiating communication. 
The design of a decentralized compensation mechanism to stabilize the amount of credits in 
the network is difficult especially in large-scale networks.  
The nodes at the network border cannot earn as many credits as the nodes at other 
locations because they are less frequently selected by the routing protocol. In our payment 
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model, Tp sells credits with real money to enable the border nodes to communicate, improve 
credit distribution, and protect the network from credit decline. However, we do not consider 
this as a fairness problem because the philosophy behind the incentive protocols is that 
packet relay is a service not an obligation. This service may not be requested from some 
nodes, i.e., the customers request the packet-relay service from the best service providers. If 
the traffic is directed through the border nodes, obviously, we sacrifice the network 
performance because the routes may be long. Due to the nodes’ mobility, the border nodes 
can change their location and earn more credits as shown in [29]. Moreover, the border nodes 
do not relay as many packets as others, and thus it is fair to charge the border nodes real 
money to compensate the other nodes that relayed more packets. 
B. Flexible Payment  
There are two ways for managing the electronic payment: on-line and off-line payment. 
For on-line payment, a merchant verifies the payment sent by a customer with the bank 
before serving the customer; and for off-line payment, a merchant serves the customer 
without involving the bank at the transaction time, i.e., instead of interacting with the bank in 
each transaction, the merchants accumulate the payments and redeem them in batch later. 
The payment management can also be classified into credit (or post-paid) and debit (or pre-
paid) payment. For credit payment, the customers are served first and charged later, e.g., the 
customers issue receipts to the merchants that submit them to the bank to redeem the 
payment, so a customer’s account will not be debited until the payment reports are processed. 
For debit payment, the customers’ accounts are charged before they are served, e.g., 
customers buy electronic coins in advance from the bank to pay the merchants, or the bank 
has to be interactively involved in each session.  
Off-line and credit payment is better for practical implementation of micropayment in 
MWNs for the following reasons. First, the connection with the bank may not be available on 
regular basis, and even if it is available, involving a centralized unit in each transaction is 
very costly and creates bottleneck at the bank due to the high frequency of low-value 
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transactions (P4 and P5 in Table 3.1). Second, customers generate their own coins (or 
evidences), which provides many flexibilities. Coins are generated on-demand, and 
customers do not need to frequently contact the bank to buy coins. In [32], it is shown that 
although some nodes have helper credits in CASHnet, they cannot communicate because 
they could not find a service point to convert the helper credits to traffic credits. Moreover, 
generating coins to pay for a specific merchant [33, 35] is not practical due to the large 
number of probable merchants in the network, and generating general coins to pay for any 
merchant is vulnerable to Double-Spending attack or requires interactive and frequent contact 
with the bank. Although, the developed payment architecture has many positives, it is 
obvious that reducing the overhead of submitting and clearing the payment reports is 
essential for the practical implementation for the following reasons. First, since the 
transactions’ number is large and multiple merchants may be involved in a transaction (P1 
and P2 in Table 3.1), generating a receipt (or payment report) per message [34] or customer 
[35] significantly increases the receipts’ number, and thus the transaction value may not 
cover its processing cost (P5 in Table 3.1). Second, the nodes have low resources (P7 in 
Table 3.1) so the overhead of storing and submitting a large number of receipts may 
stimulate the nodes to behave selfishly.  
3.3.2  Charging and Rewarding Policy 
In most existing incentive protocols, only the source node is charged no matter how the 
destination node benefits from the communication. We argue that a fair charging policy is to 
support cost sharing between the source and the destination nodes when both of them benefit 
from the communication. The payment-splitting ratio is adjustable and service-dependent, 
e.g., a DNS server should not pay for name resolution. The source and destination nodes 
agree on the payment-splitting ratio during the session establishment phase. For rewarding 
policy, some incentive protocols such as [61, 62] consider different packet relaying rewards 
that correspond to the incurred energy in relaying the packets. This rewarding policy is 
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difficult to be implemented in practice without involving complicated route discovery 
process and calculation of en-route individual payments. Therefore, similar to [33-42], we 
use fixed rewarding rate, e.g., λ credits per unit-sized message.  
In MWNs, packet loss may occur normally due to the node mobility, packet collision, 
channel impairment, etc. Ideally, any node that has ever tried to forward a packet should be 
rewarded no matter whether the packet eventually reaches its destination or not because 
forwarding a packet consumes the node’s resources. However, it is difficult to corroborate an 
intermediate forwarding action in a trustable and distributed manner without involving too 
complicated design. For example, rewarding the nodes for route establishment packets or 
packet retransmissions complicates the incentive protocol and significantly increases the 
payment reports’ number because a large number of nodes may be involved in relaying route 
establishment packets and packet retransmissions happens frequently in wireless networks. 
Our charging and rewarding policy rewards the intermediate nodes only for the delivered 
messages as indicated in Figure 3.3(a), but the source and the destination nodes are charged 
for every transmitted message whether it reaches the destination or not, as illustrated in 
Figure 3.3(a, b). For fair rewarding policy, the value of λ is determined to compensate the 
nodes for the consumed resources in relaying route establishment packets, packet 
retransmission, and undelivered packets. In Chapter 6, we will argue that this charging and 
rewarding policy can discourage the rational attacks and encourage the nodes’ cooperation. 
Table 3.2 gives the used notations in this thesis. 
 
 
a) Delivered packet 
 
b) Undelivered packet 
Figure  3.3: The payment rewarding and charging policy. 
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Table  3.2: Useful Notations. 
Symbol Description 
(M)K The ciphertext resulted from encrypting M with key K. 
A, B A is concatenated to B. 
Bs The source node’s base station. 
Bd The destination node’s base station. 
CertS and CertD The certificates of the source and the destination nodes, respectively. 
CSR(C) A complete session report for C delivered messages. 
H(X) The hash value resulted from hashing X. 
HKSi(X) The hash value resulted from keyed hashing X using the key KSi. 
HS(MX) 
Hash series of message MX. A concatenation of the keyed hash values generated by 
the shared keys between the source (S) and the session nodes (A, B,…, D), e.g. 
HS(MX)=HKSA(MX), HKSB(MX),…., HKSD(MX). 
IDi The identity of intermediate node i, or node with identity IDi. 
IDS and IDD The identities of the source and the destination nodes, respectively. 
IDXY The used pseudonym when node X communicates to node Y. 
ISR(C) An incomplete session report for C-1 delivered messages and one sent message. 
KSi The symmetric key shared between the source node and the intermediate node i. 
Mi The message sent in the ith data packet in a session. 
n The number of intermediate nodes. 
N The hash chain size. 
PC(RL) The payment clearance delay for a session with RL nodes. 
Pr 
The payment-splitting ratio that is paid by the source node. The ratio of (1-Pr) is 
paid by the destination node 
PL Padding length. 
r A random number. 
R The concatenation of the identities of the nodes in a route, e.g. IDS, ID1,…., IDD 
RA,J The rating of node A in session j 
Rm and Rh The honest and malicious nodes’ reputation thresholds, respectively. 
RL 
The route length, i.e., the number of nodes in a route including the source and the 
destination nodes, where RL = n + 1. 
RSt,i(t) and RLt,i(t) 
The short-term and long-term reputation values of node i at time t, where RSt,i(t) and 
RLt,i(t) ∈ [0, 1]. 
Si(t) 
The state of node i at time t. Si(t) ∈ {+1, 0, -1} which corresponds to {Honest, 
Suspicious, Malicious}. 
SI The session identifier that includes the path identities and establishment time. 
Sigi(X) The signature of intermediate node i on X. 
SigS(X) and SigD(X) The signatures of the source and the destination nodes on X, respectively. 
Ti A random variable denoting the time between each two report submissions of node i 
TCert The certificate lifetime. 
TC,A(t) The trust value number C of node A at time t, where C ∈ {1, 2, 3} 




The hash value number X in the hash chains generated by the source and the 
destination nodes, respectively. 
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Chapter 4                                           
ESIP: Efficient and Secure Protocol 
for Thwarting Packet Drop 
In this chapter, we propose an Efficient and Secure protocol for thwartIng Packet drop 
in MWNs, called ESIP. ESIP can stimulate the selfish nodes’ cooperation and identify and 
evict the irrational packet droppers. We also propose two trust-based and energy-aware 
routing protocols, called BAR (Best Available Route) and SRR (Shortest Reliable Route), to 
establish the routes through the highly trusted nodes having enough energy to relay the 
session messages. ESIP has four phases shown in Figure 4.1. In Data Transmission phase, 
the source node transmits messages to the destination, and the source, intermediate and 
destination nodes save security tokens called Evidences and compose payment reports. The 
nodes submit the payment reports containing the payment data of different sessions to Tp to 
redeem the payment. In Route Establishment phase, BAR and SRR routing protocols can be 
implemented to establish the routes through the highly trusted nodes having sufficient energy. 
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In Classifier phase, the Tp classifies the reports into fair and cheating. In cheating reports, 
some nodes in the session report incorrect payment, e.g., to steal credits. These reports are 
passed to Cheaters Identification phase that requests the Evidences to identify the cheating 
nodes. In Processing phase, the payment reports are processed to extract contextual and 
financial information. The financial information is passed to the Credit-Account Update 
phase to update the nodes’ credit accounts. The contextual information is passed to the Trust 
Update phase to update the nodes’ trust and reputation values. The malicious and cheating 
are evicted by denying renewing their certificates.  
 
 
Figure  4.1: The architecture of ESIP. 
4.1  Data Transmission Phase 
In this phase, the source node sends data packets to the destination along the established 




As illustrated in Figure 4.2, each node in the route shares a symmetric key with the 
source node to compute the messages’ keyed hash values. Two nodes with identity/secret key 
pairs (IDS, SKS) and (IDA, SKA) can independently compute the shared key as follows: 
 
KSA = ê(H(IDA), SkS)  
       = ê(H(IDA), µ · H(IDS))  
       = ê(µ · H(IDA), H(IDS))                    (Bilinear property)  
       = ê(SkA, H(IDS))  
       = ê(H(IDS), SkA)                          (Symmetric property) 
       = KAS   
 
 
Figure  4.2: The source node shares a key with each node in the route. 
 
Figure  4.3: The source and destination nodes’ hash chains. 
As shown in Figure 4.3, the source and the destination nodes generate hash chains by 
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). The hash values are 








. Payment non-repudiation is 








 for 2 ≤ i ≤ N. In 
order to authenticate the hash chains and link them to the session, the source and the 
destination nodes sign the roots of the hash chains and the session unique identifier (SI), 
where SI contains the identities of the nodes (the payers and the payees) in the route (R), the 
session establishment time stamp (Ts), and Pr, e.g., R = IDS, IDA, IDB, IDC, IDD and SI = R, 
Ts, Pr for the session shown in Figure 4.2. The source node’s signature is sent in the first data 
packet while the destination node’s signature is sent in the RREP packet. 
4.1.1  Data Generation and Relay 
For the first data packet, Figure 4.4 shows that the source node appends the message 
MX, VS
1 
and its signature (SigS(SI, VS
1
)). This signature proves the source node’s approval to 
pay for the session and authenticates its hash chain and links it to the session, i.e., the sender 
cannot deny generating the hash chain or initiating the session. In order to ensure the hop-by-
hop message’s authenticity and integrity, the message’s hash value (H(M1)) can be included 
in the signature, but that increases the Evidence size because H(M1) has to be attached to the 
evidence. Therefore, the source node attaches the hash series HS(M1) which contains a 
truncated keyed hash value for each node, e.g., HS(M1) = HKSA(M1), HKSB(M1), HKSC(M1), 
HKSD(M1) in Figure 4.4. Each intermediate node verifies the source node’s signature to 
compose valid Evidence. Then it verifies its message’s truncated hash value to ensure the 
message’s authenticity and integrity, and relays the packet after dropping its hash value as 
shown in Figure 4.5. Each intermediate node saves the source node’s signature and VS
1
 to be 
used in the Evidence composition. 
For the successive packets (X > 1), Figure 4.4 illustrates that the source node appends 
the pre-image of the last sent hash value (VS
X
) as an approval to pay for one more packet, 
 
 35 
and the truncated hash series (HS(MX)). Before relaying a data packet, each intermediate 
node verifies its message’s truncated keyed hash value, verifies that VS
X-1
 is generated from 
hashing VS
X
, and relays the packet after dropping its hash value. The intermediate nodes 
store only the last received hash value to be used in the Evidence composition, i.e., after 
receiving the Xth data packet, the intermediate node deletes VS
X-1





alongside with the source node’s signature are enough to prove that X messages have been 
transmitted and X-1 messages have been delivered. Each node in the session restarts a timer 
each time the node transmits or relays a packet. The session is considered broken when the 
timer expires.  
 




Figure  4.5: The hop-by-hop security packet-overhead in the Xth data packet, (X > 1). 
4.1.2  ACK Generation and Relay 
Upon receiving the Xth data packet and X ≤ N, Figure 4.4 shows that the destination 
node sends back ACK packet containing the pre-image of the last released hash value, or 
VD
X
, to acknowledge receiving the message in undeniable way. Therefore, instead of 
generating a signature per ACK packet, one signature is generated per N ACKs. Payment non-
repudiation and non-manipulation are achievable because the hash function is one-way, i.e., 





. Each intermediate node verifies that VD
X





and stores the last hash value (VD
X-1
) to be used in the Evidence composition. 
As illustrated in Figure 4.4, after releasing all the hash values of the first hash chain, the 





(1) N times. In the data packet number N+1, the source node authenticates its 





(1)), instead of signing only the last hash chain’s root. In this way, the 
intermediate nodes store only the last signature for the Evidence composition because it can 
authenticate all the used hash chains in the session. In the ACK of the message number N+1, 
the destination node sends its signature for the authentication code (AC), SI, the roots of all 




(1)). More details about AC will be given in Section 4.8. The 
nodes store the hash chains’ roots and the last signature for the Evidence composition.  
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Table  4.1: Numerical example for payment reports from node IDA. 
 
4.2  Evidence Composition and Payment-Report Submission 
Whether the route is completed or broken, each node in the route composes a payment 
report and security Evidence. The payment report contains the session identifier (SI), a flag bit 
(F) indicating whether the last received packet is data or ACK, and the number of sent, 
relayed, or received messages by the source, intermediate, and destination nodes, respectively. 
Since the connection to Tp may not be available on regular basis, the nodes accumulates the 
payment reports and submit them in batch to Tp for redemption. Table 4.1 gives numerical 
example for payment reports from node A. For the first report, A is the source node, C is the 
destination, and B and N are the intermediate nodes. In its report, node A claims that it sent 12 
messages but did not receive the ACK of M12 because F is zero. For the second report, A is the 
destination node and claims receiving 17 messages and sending the ACK of M17. For the third 
report, A is an intermediate node and claims relaying 15 messages, but it did not receive the 
ACK of M15. 
In this thesis, Evidence is defined as information that is used to establish proof about the 
occurrence of an event and the amount of payment to resolve a dispute about the amount of 
payment resulted from a session. The general format of the session evidence is shown in 
Figure 4.6(a), where the brackets “[Y]” mean that Y may not exist in some cases. An 
Evidence contains two main parts called descriptor (D) and security token (ST). The descriptor 
contains SI, the roots and seeds of the source and the destination nodes’ hash chains, and the 




(v)). ST is an undeniable proof that prevents payment 
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repudiation and manipulation and thus ensures that the payment is undeniable, unmodifiable, 
and unforgeable. In order to significantly reduce the Evidence’s size, ST can be composed by 
hashing the source and the destination nodes’ last signatures instead of attaching the large-









Section 4.8, more details will be given about the energy and trust requirements (Er and Tr). 
The Evidence size depends on the number of used hash chains because two hash values 
should be attached for each hash chain, and thus properly choosing the hash chain size can 
minimize the Evidence size. An Evidence contains VS
X
 when the node receives the Xth data 
packet and VD
X



















Figure  4.6: The formats of the payment Evidences. 
Figure 4.6(b) shows the composed Evidence when a route is broken during relaying the Xth 
data packet and 1 ≤ X ≤ N, i.e., only one hash chain is used in the route. If the route is broken 
after receiving the first data packet (X = 1), the Evidence does not have VD
1
 because the ACK 
packet is not received. For 1 < X ≤ N, the last hash value received from the destination node 
b) Last received packet is data, 1 ≤ X ≤ N. 
Evidence(X) 
 




X, Er, Tr 
   ST = H( SigS(SI , VS
1), SigD(AC, SI, VD
0) ) 
c)  Last received packet is data, N < X ≤ 2 ⋅ N. 
Evidence (X) 
 








X(1) , Er, Tr  
 ST = H( SigS(SI , VS
1, VS
1(1)), SigD(AD, SI, VD
0, VD
1(1)) ) 
d) Last received packet is ACK, 1 ≤ X ≤ N. 
Evidence(X) 
 




X, Er, Tr 
   ST = H( SigS(SI, VS




  D = SI, VD
0, Er, Tr 
  ST = H(SigD(AD, SI, VD
0) ) 
 e) The last received packet is RREP.  
a) General Evidence format for X messages. 
Evidence(X) 
 








L(v)] , Er, Tr  
  ST = H( SigS(SI , VS
1, VS








 is attached to the Evidence. Since the session is broken before receiving the ACK of 
message X, the last released hash value from the destination node is VD
X-1
 and not VD
X
. If 
this Evidence is composed by a node IDi, it is clear that IDi has received X messages and 
relayed X-1 messages but all the nodes before IDi in the route have indeed relayed X 
messages. By this way, Tp can compute a trust value for each node to depict the probability 
that the node relays a packet. The number of delivered messages (X-1) can be computed from 
the number of hashing operations required to obtain VD
X
 from hashing VD
0
, and the number 
of transmitted packets (X) can be computed from the number of hashing operations required 
to obtain VS
X
 from hashing VS
1
.  
Figure 4.6(c) shows the composed Evidence when a route is broken after receiving the Xth 
data packet and N < X ≤ 2 ⋅ N, i.e., two hash chains are used. It can be seen that the Evidence 
contains the seed and the root of the first hash chain, the root of the second hash chain, and 




(1)). Moreover, the two hash chains’ roots are 
included in the source and the destination nodes’ signatures. Figure 4.6(d) shows the 
composed Evidence when the last received packet is the ACK of the Xth message. This 
Evidence is a proof of successfully delivering X messages. Figure 4.6(e) shows the format of 
the Evidence when the last received packet is RREP.  
Evidence-aggregation technique: Instead of storing an Evidence per session, an 
aggregated Evidence can be computed using onion-hashing technique to prove the node’s 
credibility in a group of sessions. In Figure 4.7, D(i) and ST(i) are the descriptor and the 
security token of Evidence number i, respectively. Figure 4.7 shows that the aggregated 
Evidence contains one security token that is generated by onion hashing the individual 
Evidences’ security tokens. The onion-hashing technique enables the nodes to aggregate a 
recently composed Evidence to the aggregated Evidence, i.e., the Evidences are always stored 
in aggregated format to reduce their storage area. The technique is called onion hashing 
because aggregating an Evidence adds one hashing layer. However, the Evidence aggregation 
process is irreversible, i.e., the aggregated Evidence cannot be split again to individual 
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Evidences, and thus if Tp requests an Evidence, the node has to submit the aggregated 
Evidence that contains the requested one. For example, if Evidences E1, E2, and E3 are 
aggregated to EC and Tp requests E2, the node has to submit EC and Tp has to verify the node’s 
credibility in the three Evidences. Increasing the number of aggregated Evidences reduces the 
storage area but with more processing overhead, and bandwidth and energy for submitting the 
aggregated Evidence, if an Evidence is requested.  
 
 
Figure  4.7: Aggregated Evidence. 
4.3  Classifier 
The network nodes periodically submit payment reports to Tp to redeem the payment. 
As shown in Figure 4.1, the Classifier classifies the payment reports to fair or cheating. It 
first uses the report’s unique identifier (SI) to make sure that the report has not been 
processed before. Then, Tp classifies the fair payment reports to Incomplete Session Report 
(ISR(X)) or Complete Session Report (CSR(X)), where X is the messages’ number. For 
ISR(X), the last received packet is the data packet of MX (or F = 0). The name “incomplete” 
refers to the fact that the session must be broken because a node does not receive the ACK of 
MX. For CSR(X), the last received packet is the ACK of MX (or F = 1). The name “Complete” 
refers to the fact that the session may be complete because the node received the ACK of MX. 
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As illustrated in Figure 4.8, if the session is broken during relaying the RREP packet, the 
payment reports submitted from the nodes that received the packet are classifies as ISR(0). 
ISR(0) enables Tp to identify the malicious nodes that frequently drop the RREP packets. If 
the session is broken during relaying the Xth data packet, the reports submitted from the 
nodes that received the packet are classified as ISR(X). Submitting ISR(X) by node IDi does 
not entail that it has relayed the Xth data packet just that it has successfully relayed X-1 
packets and received one, but it is clear that all the nodes before IDi in the session from IDS 
to IDi-1 have indeed relayed the Xth data packet. If the session is broken after receiving the 




Figure  4.8: The evolution of the session payment report. 
The Classifier verifies the reports’ credibility by matching a node’s report with those of 
the other nodes in the session and classifies a session’s reports into fair or cheating. For the 
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cheating reports, at least one node does not submit the payment report or submits tampered 
report for rational reasons such as paying less, or for irrational reasons to circumvent the trust 
system. In the cheating reports, the nodes’ reports are inconsistent and show that the reports 
cannot occur without cheating from at least one node. For the fair reports, there are only five 
cases shown in Figure 4.9. If a session’s reports are consistent with one of these cases, the 
session’s reports are classified as fair, otherwise they are cheating. 
 
 
a)  Complete session. 
       
b)  Broken session during relaying the RREP packet. 
 
c) Broken session during relaying M1. 
 
d) Broken session during relaying MX. 
 
e) Broken session during relaying the ACK of MX. 
Figure  4.9: The possible cases for fair reports. 
 
 43 
4.4  Processing 
From Figure 4.1, the objective of this phase is to process the reports to extract the 
financial and contextual information. The financial information includes who pays whom and 
how much. The identities of the payers (source and destination nodes) and the payees 
(intermediate nodes) and the ratio of the payment are included in SI in the payment report. 
The numbers of the transmitted and delivered messages are included in the source and the 
destination nodes’ reports, respectively. The contextual information reflects the nodes’ 
misbehaviours in terms of packet drop. This information is called contextual because it is not 
carried in the reports but extracted from the reports’ context such as the format and the 
messages’ number. The fair reports can be for complete or broken sessions. A session is 
complete when the source node transmits its last message, but it is broken when at least one 
link is broken during the transmission of the data, ACK, or RREP packets. As illustrated in 
Figure 4.9(a), a session is complete when all the nodes submit Complete Session Reports for 
the same number of packets or CSR(X). Without loss of generality, Table 4.2 gives 
numerical examples for fair payment reports. Session number 1 in Table 4.2 gives an 
example for a complete session. It can be seen that F is one and X is 11 for all the reports, 
i.e., all the nodes received the ACK packet of M11.  
For the broken sessions, there are only four possible cases shown in Figure 4.9(b-d). Tp 
can identify the broken link easily from the reports’ format and/or the messages’ number. In 
Figure 4.9(b), if the link between A and B is broken during relaying the RREP packet, the 
nodes B to D submit ISR(0), but the nodes S to A do not submit reports. As shown in Session 
2 in Table 4.2, X is zero and F is one for the nodes B to D. Since node A may break the 
session and does not submit the report to circumvent the trust system, the two nodes in the 
broken link are accused. In Section 4.6.2, we will discuss how the trust system can precisely 
differentiate between the honest and the irrational packet droppers. In Figures 4.9(c, d), the 
link between B and C is broken during relaying the Xth data packet. If X = 1, B and C submit 
ISR(1) and ISR(0), otherwise they submit ISR(X) and CSR(X-1), respectively. Sessions 3 
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and 4 in Table 4.2 give numerical examples for these two cases. Since Session 3 was broken 
at B during relaying the first message, the nodes S to B report messages’ number of one and 
F of zero but the nodes C to D report messages’ number of zero and F of one. Session 4 was 
broken at B during relaying the data packet of M8 because the nodes S to B report one more 
message and F of zero. In Figure 4.9(d), the link between A and B is broken during relaying 
the ACK of MX, so they submit ISR(X) and CSR(X), respectively. In Session 5 in Table 4.2, 
11 messages were delivered, but the ACK of M11 was dropped at B because it is the last node 
received the ACK, i.e., it reports F of one.  
Table  4.2: Numerical examples for fair payment reports. 
Session №  S A B C D 
1 
X 11 11 11 11 11 
F 1 1 1 1 1 
2 
X --- --- 0 0 0 
F --- --- 1 1 1 
3 
X 1 1 1 0 0 
F 0 0 0 1 1 
4 
X 8 8 8 7 7 
F 0 0 0 1 1 
5 
X 11 11 11 11 11 
F 0 0 1 1 1 
4.5  Cheater Identification 
Our security strategy is to prevent stealing credits, paying less, or manipulating the 
honest nodes’ accounts. We should also guarantee that an honest node can get its payment 
even if the other nodes in the session collude. Moreover, instead of requesting the Evidences 
from all the nodes in the cheating session, Tp should make smart decisions by requesting the 
Evidences only from the nodes that can reveal the cheaters. The Evidence-request rule is as 
follows. If the end (source and destination) nodes’ reports are consistent, the Evidences are 
requested from the intermediate nodes that claim more payment; else, the Evidence is 
requested from the end node claiming more payment. In other words, the Evidences are 
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always requested from the nodes claiming more payment because they cannot compose them 
without undeniable security tag (signature or hash chain element) generated from the cheater. 
We do not request the Evidences from the end nodes with consistent reports because they can 
create them if they collude. To verify an Evidence’s credibility, Tp creates the Evidence’s 
security token by generating the nodes’ signatures and hashing them. The Evidence is credible 
if the resultant hash value is identical to the Evidence’s security token. Tp also verifies the 
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Table  4.3: Numerical examples for cheating payment reports. 
Session №  S A B C D 
1 X 6 10 10 10 10 
2 X 5 12 12 12 5 
3 X --- 4 --- --- --- 
4 
X 9 9 3 8 8 
F 0 0 0/1 1 1 
5 X 12 8 8 8 12 
6 
X 6 6 ---- 5 5 
F 0 0 ---- 1 1 
7 X 14 14 22 14 14 
8 
X 7 7 7 7 6 
F 0 0 1 0 1 
Without loss of generality, Table 4.3 gives numerical examples for cheating payment 
reports. For Session 1, the source node can compose a valid Evidence if it cheats because the 
destination node has released VD
6
. Tp can request the Evidence from an intermediate node or 
the destination node, and the source node is cheater if the Evidence is correct because the 
Evidence cannot be composed without releasing VS
10
. For Session 2, requesting the Evidence 









). Tp should not request the Evidence from the 
source or the destination nodes because they can compose a valid Evidence if they collude. 
For Session 3, node A cannot compose a valid Evidence without the source and the 






). If A submits a valid Evidence, S and 
D are evicted because they did not report the payment for a session they participated in, but B 
and C are punished by not rewarding them to discourage un-reporting the payment. We 
cannot evict the nodes B and C because S and D may exploit that B and C do not sign each 
message and collude to evict them. This example shows that an honest node can prove its 
credibility and receive its deserved payment even if the other nodes in the session collude. 
For Session 4, the report of node B is inconsistent with those of the other nodes. B may 
break the session and report less-payment to circumvent the trust system, or the other nodes 
collude to accuse B. For Session 5, the source and the destination nodes claim sending and 
receiving more messages and the intermediate nodes claim relaying fewer number of 
messages. This case may be rare because the attackers’ focus will be on stealing credits or 
paying less. The Tp can clear the payment according to the nodes’ reports without requesting 
evidence, i.e., the source node pays more if it cheats, and the other nodes lose credits if they 
cheat. In this way, we can achieve our security strategy and discourage cheating. We should 
not request the Evidence from the source and the destination nodes because they can 
compose valid evidence if they collude. We should not punish the intermediate nodes 
because they can compose valid Evidence for eight messages, and S and D might collude to 
falsely accuse the intermediate nodes. However, even if the source and the destination nodes 
collude, they cannot fabricate Evidence for fake sessions because the intermediate nodes’ 
signatures are required (in AD) to compose a valid Evidence, which is important to make 
False-Accusation attack difficult. The only way the attackers can falsely accuse an honest 
node is by neighboring the node and breaking the session or paying more credits by 
submitting reports for more messages such as Sessions 4 and 5 in Table 4.3. For Session 6, 
node B breaks the session and does not submit the report or the other nodes collude to falsely 
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accuse B. In this case, the colluders have to neighbor node B to compose a valid AD that 
contains B’s signature and use AD to compose the Evidence. For Session 7, node B can prove 






). For Session 8, node B claims 
delivering seven messages but D claims receiving only six messages. If node B is honest, its 
Evidence should have VD
7
.   
4.6  Credit-Account and Trust Update 
4.6.1  Credit-Account Update 
Tp clears the payment of the fair and corrected payment reports according to the 
charging and rewarding policy discussed in Section 3.3. For the cheating reports, Tp clears 
the payment in such a way that prevents stealing credits and punishes the cheating nodes to 
discourage cheating actions. For example, Session 1 in Table 4.3 is cleared for ten messages 
if S cheat, and Sessions 2 is cleared for twelve messages if S and D cheat. For Session 3, 
node A is rewarded for four messages, B and C are not rewarded because they do not submit 
the report, and S and D are charged for four messages. For Sessions 4 to 6, each node is 
rewarded or charged according to the payment in its report, so the payee that does not submit 
a report is not rewarded, the payee that submits less-payment report is rewarded less, and the 
payers that submit more-payment reports are charged more. In this way, the nodes that 
submit incorrect payment reports always lose credits. 
4.6.2  Trust Update 
As shown in Figure 4.1, Tp updates the nodes’ trust values after processing the payment 
reports and extracting the contextual information. Tp uses a trust system to calculate a trust 
value for each node. The trust system performs the following two processes: (1) For Rating 
Calculation, a rating is calculated for each node in the session; (2) For Trust Update, a 
node’s trust value is updated by aggregating its session rating with its old trust value. 
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A. Rating Calculation 
A node’s rating is the probability that the node is the session breaker, so the nodes that 
are not in a broken link receive positive rating (0) because they cannot be the session 
breakers. In other words, all the nodes in the complete sessions receive positive ratings, and 
the nodes that are not in the broken link in a broken session receive positive ratings. For the 
Sessions 4 to 6 in Table 4.3, all the nodes receive negative ratings (1), i.e., if an attacker 
manipulates its payment reports, he loses credits and also receives negative ratings. If A and 
B are in a broken link, Tp cannot accuse only A of breaking the session because B may break 
the session and compose a valid Evidence for X-1 messages instead of X messages to 
circumvent the trust system, i.e., we consider that A and B received X messages but relayed 
only X-1 messages. The rationale here is that the nodes that break the sessions more 
frequently will be accused more and thus suffer from more trust degradation. Moreover, an 
honest node can protect its trust values by not involving itself in sessions with a neighbour 
that frequently drops the packets. The neighbours of the malicious nodes change due to the 
node mobility and thus the accusations are distributed instead of focusing them on few nodes. 
Two techniques, called simple and weighted rating, are proposed to calculate the negative 
ratings of the two nodes in a broken link. 
Simple Rating Technique (SRT): The two nodes in a broken link receive equal negative 
ratings of (1), i.e., the broken link’s nodes are equally accused regardless of their session 
breakage history. The rational of this technique is that the irrational packet droppers should 
be involved in much more broken links than the honest nodes to launch effective attacks, so 
they can be identified because they collect much more negative ratings. Obviously, the 
technique is called simple because it requires simple computations and small storage area. 
Weighted Rating Technique (WRT): The two nodes in a broken link receive ratings that 
are proportional to their past session breakage frequency. If the link between nodes A and B 
is broken in session j, Equation 4.1 is used to calculate the rating of node A (RA,j) which is 
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the ratio of A’s long-term reputation value (RLt,A(t)) to the summation of the two nodes’ 
reputation values. RLt,A(t) is computed from a large number of ratings and reflects the 
probability that the node breaks a session. By the same way, the rating of B (RB,j) is its 
reputation value to the summation of the two nodes’ reputation values, or (1-RA,j).  
R, = 	,
()	,
()  	,()                                                                                                                                       (4.1) 
R, = 	,()	,








a) B is an honest node.                                              b) B is an irrational packet dropper. 
Figure  4.10: The weighted ratings for two nodes in a broken link. 
As shown in Figure 4.10, if A and B have the same reputation value, i.e., RLt,A(t) = 
RLt,B(t), they receive equal negative ratings of 0.5, but the node with worse (higher) 
reputation value receives more negative rating and vice versa. The rational of this technique 
is that the worse-reputation node is more likely the session breaker because it has been 
involved in more broken links. The main advantage of the WRT is that if honest and 
malicious nodes are involved in a broken link, they receive low and high negative ratings, 
respectively, which can improve the trust/reputation system’s effectiveness because the 
malicious nodes’ reputation values degrade much faster than those of the honest nodes do. In 
other words, the malicious nodes cannot cause big reduction in the honest nodes’ reputations 
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but the honest nodes can cause big reduction in the malicious nodes’ reputations. In Figure 
4.10(a), B is an honest node because its reputation value is low. If A is also honest, e.g., with 
a reputation value between 0.05 and 0.15, the two nodes receive ratings between 0.4 and 0.6. 
However, if A is a malicious node, e.g., with a reputation value of 0.8, A and B receive 
ratings of 0.89 and 0.11, respectively. In Figure 4.10(b), B is a malicious node with a 
reputation value of 0.8. If A is also malicious with a reputation value close to 0.8, the ratings 
of the two nodes is around 0.5. In other words, a malicious node receives less and more 
negative ratings when it neighbours malicious and honest nodes, respectively, so a malicious 
node can be identified in shorter time when it neighbours more honest nodes because its 
reputation can be degraded faster. Due to this property, if the honest nodes’ number is larger 
than that of the malicious nodes, the WRT can accelerate the degradation of the malicious 
nodes’ reputations without the need to know the expected reputation values for honest nodes 
which may not be easy, i.e., the well-behaving majority can kick out the misbehaving 
minority from the network. 
B.  Trust Update 
Using a reputation/trust system is necessary to keep track of a node’s long-term 
behaviour because sessions may be broken normally, e.g., due to the nodes’ mobility, or 
temporarily, e.g., due to the network congestion, but the high frequency of session breakage 
is an obvious misbehaviour. The reputation system computes a reputation value for each 
node by accumulating its ratings. A rating is an evaluation to the node’s behaviour in one 
session, but the reputation value is an evaluation to the node’s behaviour over a large number 
of sessions. From Figure 4.11, the reputation system stores a rating window for the latest γ 
ratings of node A, where RA,j  is the rating of A in session number j, and RA,j ∈ {0, 1} and [0, 
1] in SRT and WRT, respectively. After computing a new rating, the rating window is shifted 
to right to cancel the oldest rating (RA,j), and the new one is stored at right. Then, with 
Equation 4.3, the short-term reputation value (RSt,A(t)) is calculated by averaging the node’s 
latest γ ratings, which is an evaluation to the node’s behaviour in the latest γ sessions. 
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Finally, with Equation 4.4, the new long-term reputation value (RLt,A(t)) is calculated by 
aggregating RSt,A(t) with the old long-term reputation (RLt,A(t-1)), where RSt,A(t), RLt,A(t) and 
α ∈
 
[0, 1]. RLt,A(t) expresses the probability that A is an irrational packet dropper, i.e., RLt,A(t) 
should be large for the irrational packet droppers. α is called the fading factor that determines 
the given weight to the nodes’ past behaviour. The value of α determines how fast the long-
term reputation builds up and falls down, i.e., the lower value α has, the faster the long-term 
reputation is forgotten, and vice versa. To improve the reputation system’s effectiveness, α 
should be greater than α-1 because RLt,A(t-1) is calculated over more sessions than RSt,A(t). 
 
 
 R,(t) =  ∙ ∑ R,                                                                                                                                     (4.3) 
R,(t) = α ∙ R,(t − 1) + (1 − α) ∙ R,(t)                                                                                         (4.4)   
 
A node’s reputation value is updated by RSt,A(t) (the average of the latest γ ratings) 
instead of only the latest rating (good or bad) to better differentiate between the honest and 
the malicious nodes. In this way, the long-term reputations of the honest and the malicious 
nodes degrade slower and faster when they receive negative ratings because their short-term 
reputations are smaller and larger, respectively; and the long-term reputations of the honest 
and the malicious nodes improve faster and slower when they receive positive ratings 
because their short-term reputations are smaller and larger, respectively. Moreover, the 
honest nodes can filter out their negative ratings in two levels: shifting the rating window 
forgets the node’s behaviour in one session, and using α forgets a ratio of the node’s past 




The notion of trust used in this thesis is defined as the probability that a node will act in a 
certain way based on the node’s past actions. A trust relationship is never absolute, i.e., a 
node’s trust value reflects its ability to perform a specific action. We represent a trust value 
with a numeric value in the range [0, +1] signifying a continuous range from complete distrust 
(0) to complete trust (+1). Three trust values, T1,A(t), T#,A(t), and  T$,A(t), can be calculated 
to precisely evaluate node A’s behavior. T1,A(t) depicts the probability that A can relay a 
message successfully. From Equation 4.5, T1,A(t) is the number of relayed messages by A to 
the number of received messages in the last δ sessions. Obviously, if A drops a large 
percentage of the messages such as Black and Gray Hole attackers, T1,A(t) will be very low. 
T#,A(t) depicts the probability that A does not break a session. Since RLT,A(t) is the probability 
that node A breaks a session, T#,A(t) is 1- RLT,A(t) as given in  Equation 4.6. If A breaks a 
large percentage of the sessions, e.g., due to high mobility, T#,A(t) will be very low. If T#,A(t) 
is low, that does not necessarily mean that T1,A(t) is low too, e.g., the nodes that break many 
sessions but after relaying a large number of messages. T$,A(t) is the probability that node A 
can relay at least ψ messages in a session. From Equation 4.7, T$,A(t) is the percentage of the 
sessions that A relayed at least ψ messages in the last δ sessions. T$,A(t) gives information 
about A’s capability of relaying a minimum number of messages in one session. The trust 
values are calculated only for the last δ sessions, e.g., 100 to 200 sessions, because recent 
steady behavior is a better predictor for future behavior than behavior observed a long time 
ago. 
 
T,(t) = α ∙ T,(t − 1) +  (1 − α) ∙ № of relayed messages in the last 5 sessions№ of received messages in the last 5 sessions              (4.5) 
T#,(t) = 1 –  R,(t)                                                                                                                                   (4.6) 




Figure  4.12: The timing of report submission and clearance, and Evidence request.  
4.6.3 Trust-Update and Payment-Clearance Delay 
Unlike receipt-based incentive protocols, clearing the payment (and updating the trust 
values) once a node submits its payment report is not guaranteed because Tp has to wait until 
receiving the reports of the other nodes in the session. The payment clearance and trust 
update delay (PC) is the elapsed time from a session’s occurrence until the payment is cleared 
and the trust values are updated. Figure 4.12 shows the timing of the payment report 
submission (PR_SUB), Evidence request (E_REQ), clearance of the fair and cheating reports 
(CLR_F_R and CLR_C_R), and the Evidences’ storage window. In the figure, we assume that 
all the nodes contact Tp every certificate lifetime (TCert) to simplify our presentation. Node A 
joined the network at time t0 and submitted its first report at t1 for the sessions held in the 
period [t0, t1). At t1, the fair reports of the sessions held in [t0, t1) can be cleared because Tp 
received all the reports. At t2, node A submitted its second reports for the sessions held in [t1, 
t2). Tp may request Evidences for the sessions held in [t0, t1), and thus the cheating reports for 
the sessions held in [t0, t1) can be cleared. At t2, node A deletes all the Evidences for the 
sessions held in [t0, t1) because Tp must have cleared them. PC is bounded by TCert for the fair 
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reports and 2 ⋅ TCert for the cheating reports because Tp has to wait one extra TCert for 
requesting the Evidences. It is obvious that each node has to store the Evidences for 2 ⋅ TCert.  
However, in reality, the nodes may contact Tp at different times and the connection 
intervals may be variant in the range (0, TCert] because a connection to Tp may not be 
available on regular basis. Hence, PC may be less than TCert. If a node does not report a 
session in time TCert, the session is cleared such as Session 6 in Table 4.3. To estimate the 
average PC, we assume that the nodes submit the payment reports when they are involved in 
a large number of sessions or their certificates are near to expire to reduce the 
communication overhead. We model this behavior with truncated exponential distribution 
with parameters ∆ and TCert. Ti is a random variable denoting the time between each two 
report submissions of node i, where Ti ∈ (0, TCert]. Equation 4.8 gives the probability that Ti 
is at most t. A session’s payment is cleared and trust values are updated when all the nodes in 
the session submit their reports. PC(RL) is a random variable that denotes the payment 
clearance delay for a session with RL nodes, where PC(RL) ∈ (0, TCert]. Equation 4.9 gives the 
probability that PC(RL) is at most t. Equations 4.10 and 4.11 give the probability density 
function and the average PC(RL), respectively.  
 
 
>(T? ≤ t) = 1 − eA B ⋅ 1 − eA B ⋅ CDEF	                                                                                                                            (4.8) 
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Figure  4.13: P(PC(RL) ≤  t) VS t at different values of RL. 
 
Figure  4.14: The average payment clearance delay at different values of RL. 
∆ is 1/15 in Figures 4.13 and 4.14 and TCert is 30 days in Figure 4.13. Figure 4.13 shows 
that the increase of the route length (RL) decreases the probability of clearing the payment 
and updating the trust values by time t. Figure 4.14 shows that the average payment clearance 
delay can be less than TCert, e.g., at RL of 5 and TCert of 60, the average delay is 30 days. This 
delay is acceptable because the nodes do not need to wait until gaining credits to 
communicate, i.e., the nodes communicate first and pay later and they can buy credits for real 
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money. Figure 4.14 shows that shorter TCert can reduce the delay but with more processing 
overhead on Tp for renewing the certificates. 
4.7 Identification of Irrational Packet-Droppers  
A node’s state is a conclusion for its behaviour based on the accumulated experience on 
it (or its reputation value), which can also be an expectation to its behaviour in the future. A 
node’s state space includes three mutually disjoint states: honest or regular node (+1), 
suspicious or undecided (0), and malicious or irrational packet dropper (-1). From Equation 
4.12, the state of node A (SA(t)) is honest if the node’s long-term reputation value is below 
the honest threshold Rh; SA(t) is malicious if the node’s long-term reputation value is above 
the malicious threshold Rm; otherwise, SA(t) is suspicious. Moreover, a node is identified as 
malicious when it spends ω consecutive sessions in the suspicious state because the node 
receives negative ratings more than the normal rate. A node is also identified as malicious 
when the difference between the spent times in the honest and the suspicious states is less 
than β because the node receives positive ratings less than the normal rate. The state 
transition diagram for a node is shown in Figure 4.15. A suspicious node may be honest but 
its reputation is degraded temporarily, so instead of taking a harsh reaction by characterizing 
this node as malicious, the reputation system keeps collecting information about the node’s 
behaviour to figure out whether its misbehaviour is temporary or genuine. If a suspicious 
node is honest, it should be able to improve its reputation and return to the honest state, but 
the irrational packet dropper stays some time in the suspicious state before it is transferred to 
the malicious state. As shown in the figure, a node is transferred directly from the honest to 
the cheating state without passing through the suspicious state when it commits a clear 
cheating action such as the source node in Session 1 in Table 4.3.  
 




Figure  4.15: A node’s state transition diagram. 
The threshold Rm can reveal the attackers that break sessions more than the normal rate 
and the threshold β can reveal the attackers that break a large number of consecutive sessions 
such as the broken nodes that misbehave after gaining good reputation. Moreover, the 
threshold ω can reveal the attackers that spend a long time in the suspicious state such as 
Gray-Hole attackers. Since it is impossible to know whether a packet is dropped normally or 
intentionally, the attackers may drop packets with keeping their reputations above the 
reputation system’s thresholds. If the thresholds are close enough to the normal rate, the 
reputation system can force the attackers to break sessions at a lower rate than the system’s 
thresholds to avoid eviction, i.e., the system can force the smart attackers to behave in such a 
way that is not severe threat to the network proper operation. In Section 4.8, we will propose 
a trust-based routing protocol to establish the routes through the highly-trusted nodes, and 
thus the honest nodes with relatively low trust values have low chance to participate in 
routes.  
Rh enables an honest node to filter out its negative ratings because the node is identified 
honest as long as its reputation value is less than Rh. The reputation system tolerates the 
degradation of an honest node’s reputation up to Rm provided that the node improves its 
reputation and returns to the honest state. Actually, there is an intuitive trade-off between the 
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required time to detect the malicious nodes and the number of honest nodes that are falsely 
identified as malicious, which can be controlled by the thresholds. For larger Rm, the 
reputation system tolerates more misbehaviours and reduces the false accusations but at the 
expense of longer detection time because the malicious nodes have to break more sessions to 
be identified. The Black-Hole attackers can be identified in short time because their 
reputation values degrade fast, but it takes longer to identify the Gray-Hole attackers because 
they behave honestly for a while to build up their reputations.  
4.8  Trust-Based and Energy-Aware Routing Protocols  
Although the nodes having reputation values less than Rh are considered honest, the 
honest nodes have different packet-drop probabilities, i.e., the nodes with high hardware-
capability and low mobility have less packet-drop ratio. In this section, we propose two 
routing protocols called the Shortest Reliable Route (SRR) and the Best Available Route (BAR) 
to route the packets through the highly-trusted nodes having sufficient energy to minimize 
the probability of route breakage. The SRR protocol establishes the shortest route that meets 
the source node’s energy and trust requirements, but the destination node selects the best route 
in the BAR protocol.  
Route reliability can be computed from the trust values of the nodes en route to get 
probabilistic information about the route stability and lifetime, which can be used in route 
selection. Equation 4.13 gives the probability that a transmitted message will be delivered to 
the destination node across the intermediate nodes W, X, Y, and Z. In the same way, 
T2,WXYZ(t)  and T$,WXYZ(t)  given in Equations 4.14 and 4.15 are the probability that the 
session will not be broken and the probability that at least ω messages will be transmitted 
along the route, respectively. Comparing the reliabilities of Routes 1 and 2 in Table 4.4, the 
low-trust node, such as X in route 2, has very little chance to be involved in a session because 
it significantly degrades the route reliability. Although the nodes’ trust values of Route 3 are 
 
 59 
the same as those of Route 1, Route 3 has higher reliability, which demonstrates that shortest 
routes are preferable. The probability to deliver a message through Route 4 is close to zero 
because the nodes have very low trust values, which demonstrates the importance of choosing 
good nodes. 
 T,_`ab(t) = T,_(t) ⋅ T,`(t) ⋅ T,a(t) ⋅ T,b(t)                                                                                      (4.13) 
T#,_`ab(t) = T#,_(t) ⋅ T#,`(t) ⋅ T#,a(t) ⋅ T#,b(t)                                                                                     (4.14) 
T$,_`ab(t) = T$,_(t) ⋅ T$,`(t) ⋅ T$,a(t) ⋅ T$,b(t)                                                                                     (4.15) 
Table  4.4: Numerical examples for route reliability.  
Route № T1,W(t) T,`(t) T,a(t) T,b(t) T1,WXYZ(t) 
1 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.4096 
2 0.8 0.2 0.8 0.8 0.1024 
3 0.8 0.8 0.8 ---- 0.512 
4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0016 
4.8.1  SRR Routing Protocol 
RREQ Delivery: In order to establish an end-to-end route, the source node broadcasts 
the Route Request Packet (RREQ) that contains its identity (IDS) and certificate (CertS), the 
destination node’s identity (IDD), Time-To-Live (TTL) or the maximum number of hops, the 
session establishment time stamp (Ts), the payment-splitting ratio (Pr), the trust requirement 
(Tr), the energy requirement (Er), and its signature AS = SigS(IDS, IDD, Ts, Pr, Tr, Er). The 
source node is charged the ratio of Pr of the total payment and the destination node is 
charged the ratio of 1-Pr. Tr is the minimum trust values an intermediate node can have, and 
Er is the minimum number of messages an intermediate node commits to relay in the session, 
which is related to the node’s residual energy. If a node breaks the route before relaying Er 
messages, the node’s trust values are decreased. The route reliability is bounded by Tr raised 
to the TTL-th power. 
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After receiving the RREQ packet, a node first checks that the time stamp is within a 
proper range, TTL is not zero, and its trust values are at least Tr. The node broadcasts the 
RREQ packet after attaching its identity and certificate, signing the packet signature, and 
decrementing the TTL, as shown in Figure 4.16. This signature authenticates the node and 
holds it accountable for dropping the next packets, i.e., Tp can make sure that the node has 
indeed participated in the session. In Figure 4.16, AA = SigA(AS), AB = SigB(AA), and AC = 
SigC(AB). The certificates enable the nodes to verify the signatures and prove that the nodes 
are member in the network, which is important to prevent the external attackers from 
participating in the network. Only the first RREQ is broadcasted and the subsequent requests 
for the same session are discarded. The source node’s requirements cannot be achieved if it 
does not receive the RREP within τS time period. The source node can send a second round of 
the RREQ after reducing its requirements, or revert to the BAR protocol. The rationale of the 
SRR protocol is that the node that satisfies the source node’s requirements is trusted enough 












Figure  4.16: The route establishment packets. 
---------------------------- RREQ ---------------------------- 
S →  * : <RREQ, IDS, CertS, IDD, Ts, Pr, Tr, Er, TTL, AS> 
A →  * : <RREQ, IDS, CertS, IDD, Ts, Pr, Tr, Er, IDA, CertA, TTL-1, AA> 
B →  * : <RREQ, IDS, CertS, IDD, Ts, Pr, Tr, Er, IDA, CertA, IDB, CertB, TTL-2, AB> 
C →  * : <RREQ, IDS, CertS, IDD, Ts, Pr, Tr, Er, IDA, CertA, IDB, CertB, IDC, CertC, TTL-3, AC> 
D           : <RREQ, IDS, CertS, IDD, Ts, Pr, Tr, Er, IDA, CertA, IDB, CertB, IDC, CertC, TTL-3, AC> 
----------------------------------- RREP ---------------------------------- 
D →  C: <RREP, SI, CertD, VD
0, AD> 
C →  B: <RREP, SI, CertD, VD
0, AD, CertC> 
B →  A: <RREP, SI, CertD, VD
0, AD, CertC, CertB> 
B →  A: <RREP, SI, CertD, VD
0, AD, CertC, CertB, CertA> 
  S          : <RREP, SI, CertD, VD




Route Selection: The destination node receives RREQ packets for different routes to the 
source. The first received RREQ packet is the shortest route that achieves the source node’s 
requirements. If the verification of the first arrived packet’s signature (AC in Figure 4.16) 
fails, the destination node verifies the signature of the second packet and so on. In this way, if 
IDi manipulates Ai, it cannot prevent establishing the session. The destination node signs the 
RREQ packet’s signature to generate the session nodes’ authentication code or AD, e.g., AD = 
SigD(AC, SI, VD
0
) in Figure 4.16, and sends the Route Reply Packet (RREP) containing VD
0
, 
its certificate, AD, and the session identifier (SI), where SI = IDS, IDA, IDB, IDC, IDD, Ts, Pr 
in Figure 4.16. AD can authenticate the session nodes with reduced packet overhead because 
it requires less space than attaching a separate signature for each node. AD authenticates the 
destination node’s hash chain and links it to the session, and proves the node’s approval to 
pay for the session.  
RREP Delivery: Each intermediate node verifies the RREP packet’s signatures to 
authenticate the nodes between itself and the destination node. For example, in Figure 4.16, 
node B authenticates C and D from their signatures in the RREP packet and authenticates S 
and A from the RREQ packet signature. This signature verification process is necessary to 
make sure that AD is correct, and thus to ensure the Evidence’s integrity and protect the 
payment. Each intermediate node relays the RREP packet after adding its certificate. It also 
saves AD and VD
0
 to be used in the evidence composition. If a node lies in its residual energy, 
the route will be broken at this node and thus its trust values degrade. The source and the 
destination nodes verify the intermediate nodes’ certificates to make sure that the nodes can 
indeed achieve the minimum trust requirements. 
4.8.2  BAR Routing Protocol 
RREQ Delivery: The RREQ packet is the same as that of the SRR protocol but Tr is the 
route reliability field (R_reliability) that is initialized to one and Cm(S) is attached instead of 
Er, where Cm(S) is the expected number of transmitted messages. For the first received RREQ 
 
 62 
packet, an intermediate node A adds the number of messages it commits to relay (Cm(A)), 
and updates the R_reliability by multiplying it with its trust value. Er is the minimum 
message’s number committed by the nodes in the route. Blind flooding generates few routes 
because each node broadcasts the RREQ once, which disables potential better routes. To solve 
this issue, the BAR allows each node to broadcast the RREQ more than once if the 
R_reliability or the Er of the recently received packet is greater than the last broadcasted 
packet. For example, in Figure 4.17, node M receives the first RREQ at time t1 with 
R_reliability T, of 0.3. At t2, M broadcasts the packet after updating the R_reliability to be T,c, where T,c = T, ⋅ T,c. At t3, M receives the second RREQ packet for the same 
session with R_reliability of T,def that is less than T, , so it discards the RREQ packet. At 
t4, M receives the RREQ packet with R_reliability of T,`ab_  that is larger than the last 
broadcasted packet, so it broadcasts the packet at t5 after updating the R_reliability. In this 
example, we calculate the R_reliability only for the first trust value for simplicity. However, it 




















Figure  4.17: Broadcasting the RREQ packets in the BAR routing protocol. 
Route Selection: After receiving the first RREQ packet, the destination node waits for τD 
time window to keep receiving other RREQ packets if there are, and then selects the best 
available route. First, the destination node excludes the routes with very low reliability. If 
there are multiple routes with Er at least Cm(S), the destination node selects the most reliable 
route, otherwise, the destination node establishes multiple routes with a total Er of Cm(S) or 
more in such a way that reduces the routes’ number and maximizes the reliability. For 
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example, in Figure 4.18, the destination node D receives two possible routes (A, B, C) and (X, 
Y, Z, W) and chooses the most reliable one, assuming the two routes’ Er are Cm(S) or more.  
RREP Delivery: This phase is identical to that of the SRR routing protocol.  
 
 







Chapter 5                                      
PRIPO: Privacy-Preserving Routing 
and Incentive Protocol 
5.1  Preliminary 
Network Model: In this chapter, we propose a Privacy-preserving Routing and Incentive 
PrOtocol called PRIPO for hybrid ad hoc wireless network. Unlike the proposed protocol in 
Chapter 4, all the communication has to be relayed through at least one base station, i.e., we 
consider only the hybrid communication mode. The source node (S) sends its packets to the 
source base station (Bs), if necessary in multiple hops. Bs forwards the packets to the 
destination base station (Bd) if the destination node (D) resides in a different cell, and finally, 
the packets are sent to D, possibly in multiple hops again. The part of the route between S and 
Bs is called uplink, and the part of the route between Bd and D is called downlink. A mobile 
node X should register with Tp to get a permanent shared symmetric key KX and a unique 
identity IDX.  
Payment Model: The source and the destination nodes are charged and the uplink 
intermediate nodes are rewarded only for the messages received by Bs even if they do not 
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reach to D. The downlink intermediate nodes are rewarded only when Bd receives ACK 
packet from D. In Chapter 6, we will argue that this rewarding and charging policy can 
discourage cheating actions and encourage the nodes’ cooperation without submitting 
payment receipts or reports from the nodes.  
Threat and Trust Models: The attackers have full control on their nodes and thus they 
can change the nodes’ operations. The attackers work individually or collude with each other 
to launch sophisticated attacks. Specifically, the attackers attempt to steal credits, pay less, and 
communicate freely. Location privacy is defined as the ability to prevent other parties from 
learning one’s current and past locations [63], and anonymity is defined as the state of being 
un-identifiable within a set of subjects called the anonymity set [64]. 
Legitimate nodes or eavesdroppers may attempt to learn the nodes’ real identities and 
locate individual nodes in number of hops and track their movements. The attackers also aim 
to launch Traffic-Analysis attacks to monitor the communication activities of the nodes. The 
mobile nodes are probable attackers because they are motivated to misbehave to increase their 
welfare. However, Tp and the base stations are secure because they are operated by a single 
operator that is motivated to ensure the network security. The node’s real identities and 
locations are known to the base stations and Tp in order to route the messages accordingly and 
for charging and rewarding operations. Nevertheless, the nodes’ long-term keys are known 
only to Tp.  
We do not consider the global eavesdropper that can monitor every radio transmission on 
every communication link in the network at all time. This is because these attacks are too 
complicated to occur in civilian applications and scalable networks, and the countermeasures 
usually require much overhead. In PRIPO, the global eavesdroppers may locate the source 
and the destination nodes and identify the route if there is only one active session in the 
network, but they cannot link the nodes’ pseudonyms to the real identities. For the trust 
models, the nodes trust Tp and the base stations with performing billing and auditing correctly 





Figure  5.1: Pseudonyms generation technique. 
5.2  Pseudonyms and Shared Keys 
To protect a node’s identity privacy, the node uses pseudonyms such that only an 
intended node can link the pseudonyms to each other and to the real identity. In this way, 
even if an attacker could link a pseudonym to a node, he cannot violate the node’s privacy for 
a long time. As shown in Figure 5.1, if the nodes W and X share a secret key K and a public 
seed r, they can generate shared pseudonyms by iteratively keyed hashing r, where Hf()(r) 
refers to the message authentication code resulted from iteratively hashing r j times using the 
key K. The hash values generated from hashing r with odd numbers (Hf()(r), Hf($)(r), etc) 
are used by node W and the those generated from hashing r with even numbers (Hf(#)(r), Hf(g)(r), etc) are used by node X. The frequency of pseudonym change (i) is the number of 
packets that use one pseudonym, e.g., if i is one, each pseudonym is used for one packet.  
In order to keep pseudonym synchronization between W and X, each node compares a 
packet’s pseudonym with the current and next pseudonyms. For example, in the packets’ 
numbers 1 to i in Figure 5.1, W compares X’s pseudonym to Hf(#)(r) and Hf(g)(r). Moreover, 
a node does not change its pseudonym more than once before the other node changes its 
pseudonym. In this way, if packet (i+1) is lost, the nodes do not lose synchronization because 
W does not use Hf(h)(r) before receiving Hf(g)(r) from X. After X receives Hf(#)(r), it knows 
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that W wants to change pseudonym and thus it also changes its pseudonym by releasing Hf(g)(r). The main advantage of this pseudonym generation technique is that the nodes do not 
have to change their pseudonyms at a given frequency, but this change can be arbitrarily 
triggered by X or W without losing synchronization. The technique is efficient because a 
pseudonym generation requires a lightweight hashing operation and does not require large 
storage area or frequently contacting Tp to re-fill pseudonyms. This enables the nodes to 
reduce the lifetime of each pseudonym to improve the users’ privacy. Pseudonyms can also 
be computed before receiving a packet to avoid delaying the packet relay.  
 
PRIPO uses three types of symmetric keys and pseudonyms:- 
1) Node-to-Tp: Node X and Tp share a long term key KX. Using this key, they can 
generate a long term pseudonyms IDXTp and IDTpX. 
 
2) Node-to-Base-Station: Each node shares a symmetric key and pseudonyms with its 
cell’s base station. Once the node leaves the cell, the key and the pseudonyms become 
invalid. When node X first joins a new cell, Tp mutually authenticates the node and the cell’s 
base station. As shown in Figure 5.2, node X sends an Authentication Request (AREQ) 
packet containing a pseudonym shared with Tp (IDXTp) and the encryption of its real identity 
and IDXTp, where (M)K refers to the ciphertext resulted from encrypting M with the key K. 
AREQ authenticates X to Tp because the secret key KX is required to compose the packet. Tp 
replies with the node’s real identity, the shared key between X and Bs (KXBs = KBsX), and the 
seed of the pseudonyms (r). r and KXBs are used to generate pseudonyms shared between X 
and Bs. In this way, Tp mutually authenticates X and Bs without revealing the node’s long-
term secret key.  
 
3) Node-to-Node: In route establishment phase, the base station authenticates each two 
neighboring nodes W and X to each other, and distributes a one-session shared key (KWX = 




Figure  5.2: Authentication phase. 
 
Figure  5.3: Route Establishment phase. 
5.3  Route Establishment Phase 
As shown in Figure 5.3, S broadcasts an Uplink Route Request (URREQ) packet that is 
forwarded by Bs to Bd if D resides in a different cell. Bd broadcasts the Downlink Route 
Request (DRREQ) packet and D sends back the Route Reply Packet (RREP) packet. Finally 
Bs and Bd send the Uplink and Downlink Route Establishment (UREST and DREST) packets 
to establish the uplink and downlink routes, respectively. 
URREQ: As shown in Figure 5.4, the URREQ packet contains dummy bits called 
padding (Pad) [65] and the encryption of the source and the destination nodes’ real identities, 
the padding length (PL), and a unique request identifier (Uni). Uni contains the pseudonym 
shared with Bs and time stamp. The encryption part authenticates S to Bs. The random-length 
padding prevents the attackers from learning the anonymous source node’s location from the 
packet size and confuses the neighbours of S whether the packet is sent or relayed by S. Each 
intermediate node adds its pseudonym shared with Bs and broadcasts the packet. It also 
 X → Bs→ Tp: <AREQ, IDXTp, (IDXTp, IDX)KX> 
Tp → Bs: <(IDX, KBsX, r, IDTpX, (R, KXBs)KX)KTpBs> 




stores Uni in the routing table and drops any further requests with the same identifier to 
broadcast the request once and avoid routing loops. For the first URREQ packet, Bs decrypts 
the encryption part to know the real identity of the destination node and the padding length, 
and forwards the request to D.  
 
 
Figure  5.4: Anonymous uplink route establishment. 
 
Figure  5.5: Anonymous downlink route establishment. 
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DRREQ: As shown in Figure 5.5, the DRREQ packet contains Time-To-Live (TTL), a 
unique request identifier (Dni) that contains the pseudonym shared with D and time stamp, 
and the real identity of the source node, encrypted with the shared key with D. Bd does not 
add padding because we do not aim to preserve the base station’s location privacy. Each 
intermediate node adds its pseudonym shared with Bd and broadcasts the packet if TTL is 
greater than zero. The node stores Dni in the routing table and drops any further requests with 
the same identifier to broadcast the request once and avoid routing loops. D broadcasts the 
packet as well after adding its pseudonym to deprive the attackers from inferring the 
destination of the packet. PRIPO uses very efficient trapdoor to inform D about the session. 
D only compares the packet pseudonym with its to know whether it is the destination. This is 
important because the DRREQ packets are received by a large number of nodes. 
DRREP: Figure 5.5 shows that the RREP packet contains the identities of the nodes in 
the route and padding to protect the location privacy of the destination node. Each 
intermediate node relays the packet after replacing its pseudonym with the pseudonym of the 
next hop node.  
UREST: The objective of the UREST packet is to inform the intermediate nodes to act as 
packet forwarders and distribute the session keys shared between each two neighboring 
nodes. From Figure 5.4, the UREST packet contains a fresh pseudonym shared with each 
node and session key. Each intermediate node removes one encryption layer using the shared 
key with the Bs, removes its pseudonym and saves the session key shared with its previous 
neighbor in the route. The node hashes this key to get the shared key with the other neighbor, 
e.g., node W uses KSW to communicate with S and HKWBs(KSW) to communicate with X. 
Obviously, HKWBs(KSW) is similar to KXW. In this way, the number of distributed keys is 
nearly halved in order to reduce the packet overhead. Only the intended nodes can decrypt 
the packet, which is important for authorizing the network access and securing the payment. 
Padding is added to preserve the source node’s location privacy, i.e., it is difficult to infer the 
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source node’s location from the UREST packet size. The source node relays the UREST to 
prevent its neighbors from knowing that it is the source node.  
DREST: From Figure 5.5, the format of DREST packet is the same as the UREST 
packet.  
 
Figure  5.6: Anonymous uplink data transmission. 
 
Figure  5.7: Anonymous downlink data transmission. 
5.4  Data Transfer Phase 
As shown in Figure 5.6, the data packet at S contains the shared pseudonym with W 
(IDSW), the message’s number (C), and the message (MC) and its message authentication 
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code (HKSBs(MC)), all encrypted with the shared key with Bs. Each intermediate node 
replaces the packet’s pseudonym with the one shared with the next node, and encrypts the 
iteratively-encrypted part with the shared key with the next node. The source base station 
removes the encryption layers and checks the message integrity, and forwards it to the 
destination base station.  
From Figure 5.7, the destination base station iteratively encrypts the message with the 
keys shared between each two nodes. Each intermediate node checks whether the packet’s 
pseudonym belongs to it and decrypts one layer of the iteratively encrypted data and changes 
the pseudonym with the one shared with the next node and relays the packet. The destination 
node acknowledges the messages it correctly receives. The uplink and downlink 
acknowledgement packets (UACK and DACK) are shown in Figures 5.6 and 5.7, 
respectively. In this way, each intermediate node performs only one encryption or decryption 
operation but the base stations perform more operation. PRIPO can be used for bidirectional 
communication without any modification. The overhead of the data packets is only one 
pseudonym instead of attaching the whole route identities similar to DSR routing protocol 
[66].  
5.5  Accounting and Auditing Phase 
To avoid instantaneously contacting Tp in each session, the base stations manage 
payment reports for the nodes in their cells and submit the reports to Tp. The payment reports 
contain the number of messages sent, received, and relayed by the nodes. Once Tp receives 









Chapter 6                                         
Security Analysis 
6.1  Security Analysis for ESIP 
6.1.1  Defence against Payment Manipulation 
Our security objective is to prevent the attackers from achieving gains such as stealing 
credits or paying less. In our incentive protocol, the charges and rewards are based on 
payment reports submitted by autonomous nodes, so a node or even a group of colluding 
nodes may attempt to cheat the protocol to increase their welfare.  
For Free-Calling (or Riding) attacks, two colluding intermediate nodes in a legitimate 
session manipulate the session packets to piggyback their data to communicate freely. To 
thwart this attack, the messages’ integrity and authenticity are checked at each node by 
verifying the message’s keyed hash value, and thus the first node after the colluder can detect 
any addition or modification to the packets and drop them. The RREQ and RREP packets’ 
integrity and authenticity can be verified at each node by verifying the signatures. Launching 
Free Riding attacks against the ACK packets is not possible because each ACK contains a 
hash-chain element that is verified at each node and thus the packet’s integrity and 
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authenticity can be verified at each node. In a malicious attack, node A may manipulate the 
hash value of D to consume the nodes’ resources because the packet will be dropped at D and 
thus C and D are unfairly accused of dropping the packet. To simplify our presentation in 
Chapter 4, we consider that a keyed hash value covers only the message, but it should cover 
the whole packet to thwart this attack. For example, in Figure 4.5, the keyed hash value of 
node B should be HKSB(MX, VS
X
, HKSC(MX), HKSD(MX)), so that node B can stop propagating 
the packets with incorrect hash values.  
It is obvious that the packet overhead will be large for long routes because the source 
node attaches a keyed hash value for each node in the route. To reduce the packet overhead, 
the message’s keyed hash value can be truncated significantly, e.g., the size of the truncated 
hash value (η) can be 4 or 5 bytes instead of 16 bytes in HMAC-MD5. This severe hash 
truncation is secure in our protocol for the following reasons: (1) The packet security lifetime 
is extremely short, i.e., if an intermediate node does not relay a packet in a short time, the 
route is considered broken and re-established, so a malicious node does not have long time to 
run complicated programs to figure out the truncated keyed hash values for the manipulated 
message; (2) Without knowing the secret key, computing the keyed hash value is not 
possible; and (3) An attacker has to figure out a keyed hash value for each victim between 
itself and the other colluder. Therefore, an attacker has to compute multiple truncated keyed 
hash values without knowing the keys in a limited time, which is not possible. What an 
attacker can do is to replace the truncated hash with a random value, but the probability to hit 
the correct value is extremely low, e.g., for η = 4 bytes, the probabilities to hit one and two 




, respectively. Moreover, if the 
manipulated hash value is not correct, the attacker’s neighbour drops the packet and thus the 
attackers’ trust values are degraded. 
However, the hash truncation increases the random collision probability, i.e., the 
corrupted and the original messages have the same truncated keyed hash value. Using 





, respectively. In addition, since the message integrity is checked at each node, the 
probability that the destination node falsely accept a corrupted message as correct is (n1 ⋅ 1.2 ⋅ 
10
-5
) for η of 4, which is equivalent to the probability that the hash collision occurs in n1 
successive nodes, where n1 is the number of nodes from the node at which the message is 
corrupted to the destination node. This probability can be reduced with the increase of η but 
the packet overhead increases, so η can be dynamic to balance the probability of falsely 
accepting corrupted message and the packet overhead, i.e., η can be longer for short routes. 
Moreover, some nodes in a route can have longer η than others, e.g., η can be longer for the 
destination node to prevent falsely accepting corrupted messages. MD5 is faster and has 
shorter digest length than SHA-2, but SHA-2 is more collision resistant, so SHA-2 can be 
used in digital signing operations that require high collision resistance, and MD5 is used to 
compute the keyed hashes and the hash chain.   
For Double-Rewarding attack, the attacker attempts to clear a payment report multiple 
times to be rewarded multiple times for the same session. Tp can thwart the attack and 
identify the attacker because it uses the report’s unique identifier (SI) to check whether the 
report has been processed before. For Double-Spending attack, the attackers attempt to 
generate identical reports for different sessions to pay once. In ESIP, the reports cannot be 
repeated because each report contains the identities of the route nodes and time stamp. Even 
if the attackers establish different routes at the same time, the reports’ identifiers are different 
because at least one intermediate node is different.  
For Evidence-Forgery-and-Manipulation attack, the attackers attempt to forge an 
Evidence or manipulate a valid Evidence to steal credits. This is not possible using secure 
hash function and public key cryptography because it is not possible to forge or modify the 
nodes’ signatures and to compute the private keys from the public ones. It is also not possible 









. Moreover, if an attacker attaches a random 
value for an Evidence’s security token, the probability to hit the correct value is nearly zero, 
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e.g., this probability is 6.8410
-49
 with using SHA-1 [67, 68] with digest value of 20 bytes, 
Tp can identify the attackers when their Evidences’ verifications fail. The intermediate nodes 
can verify the source and the destination nodes’ signatures and hash chain, which is 
important to verify the Evidences and thus secure the payment. If the intermediate nodes 
cannot verify the payment data, the source node may send packets with invalid payment data.  
For Packet-Replay attacks, the internal or external attackers may record valid packets 
and replay them in different place and/or time claiming that they are fresh to establish 
sessions under the name of others to communicate freely. In ESIP, a fresh time stamp is used 
in the RREQ packet to establish a route and thus stale RREQ packets can be identified and 
dropped if the time stamp is not within a proper range. For Impersonation attack, the 
attackers attempt to impersonate others to communicate freely or steal credits. This attack is 
not possible because the nodes use their private keys to sign the packets, and the attackers 
cannot compute others’ private keys. For Message-Repudiation attack, the attackers attempt 
to deny transmitting a message. In ESIP, each node can ensure that the intended user has sent 
a message, but unlike signature-based protocols, it cannot prove that to a third party. 
However, message non-repudiation is important for other applications such as electronic 
commerce where a user sends messages to authorize the recipients to perform actions on its 
behalf. For Payment-Repudiation attacks, the attackers attempt to deny initiating a session or 
the amount of payment so as not to pay. In ESIP, the payers cannot deny the payment 
because the signatures and the hash chains can guarantee the payment non-repudiation.  
For Fake-Intermediate-Node attack, the attackers may claim that they have non-existent 
neighbours to make the source and the destination nodes pay more, collect credits to the non-
existent neighbour, or falsely accuse the non-existent node of breaking the session or un-
submitting the session report. The nodes in a session authenticate themselves to thwart this 
attack and external attacks [69] that are launched by the external attackers who are not 
members in the network and the nodes’ authentication code (AD) is included in the Evidence, 
e.g., the external attackers participate in route discovery phase with the intention of dropping 
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the data packets to launch Denial-of-Service attacks. Moreover, the payment is cleared 
without punishing or rewarding the victim nodes such as Session 6 in Table 4.3. However, 
the colluding nodes may exchange their cryptographic information to insert non-existent 
neighbours to collect credits for them without participation in relaying the packets. This 
attack is a type of the known routing attack called Route-Lengthening. First, exchanging the 
cryptographic information may discourage the attack because colluders can steal the credits 
of each other or commit malicious actions under their names. Second, the attack does not 
always work because it may lead to sub-optimal route due to the preference of shortest 
routes. Third, Tp can identify the attackers when it observes that some nodes appear in 
different locations at the same time. Finally, the proposed solutions for secure routing 
protocols such as ARAN [70] and Ariadne [71] can be implemented in ESIP.  
For Destination-Node-Robbery attack, the source node colludes with some intermediate 
nodes to steal credits from the destination node by sending bogus messages paid by the 
source and destination nodes, or fabricating or manipulating evidences. For example, from 
Figure 2.1, if the source node colludes with К intermediate nodes, the intermediate nodes 
earn (X ⋅ λ ⋅ К) credits but the source node pays (X ⋅ λ ⋅ n ⋅ Pr) for X packets. Obviously, the 
colluders can achieve gains when (X ⋅ λ ⋅ К - X ⋅ λ ⋅ n ⋅ Pr) > 0 or (К - n ⋅ Pr) > 0. In ESIP, 
the colluding nodes cannot fake or manipulate Evidences to steal credits from the destination 
node because the destination node’s signature and hash chain elements are required to 
compose a valid Evidence. Moreover, a session cannot be established and a valid Evidence 
cannot be composed if the destination node is not interested in the communication because its 
signature is required. The intermediate nodes are rewarded only when the destination node 
acknowledges receiving correct messages, and thus they do not earn from the bogus 
messages. For Denial-of-Report-Submission attack, the colluding attackers residing close to 
the base station may attempt to prevent the nodes to submit the payment reports to Tp. First, 
the nodes can accumulate the reports and submit them to Tp in batch to reduce the 
communication overhead, e.g., the reports may be submitted every few days, and thus the 
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nodes can repeatedly try to contact Tp during this period. Second, the nodes transmit the 
Report-Submission-Request packet to Tp to submit the reports. This packet contains the 
identity of the submitter, time stamp, the payment reports, and the submitter’s signature. The 
signature authenticates the submitter, thwarts packet replay attack, and ensures the packet’s 
integrity. Tp replies with the Reports-Submission-Confirmation packet containing Tp’s 
signature for the reports to confirm the reports’ submission. The node does not delete the 
reports before receiving the Reports-Submission-Confirmation packet. Third, the nodes may 
change their cells due to the nodes’ mobility, and thus if they cannot submit the reports 
through one base station, they can submit the reports through others. Finally, the nodes can 
contact Tp using wired networks such as Internet and Wi-Fi, as explained in Section 3.1.  
For Reduced-Payment attack, some intermediate nodes may collude with the source and 
the destination nodes to submit payment reports with less payment. In ESIP, even if a group 
of nodes colludes to reduce an honest node’s rewards, the node can prove its credibility and 
gets its correct payment, such as Sessions 3 and 7 in Table 4.3. In our payment model, the 
source and the destination nodes can communicate even if they do not have sufficient credits, 
so for Payment-Denial attacks, the attackers may join the network for a short time and leave 
without paying their debts. Different from the traditional ad hoc networks that can be 
temporarily established and similar to the current single hop cellular networks, MWN is a 
long life network where the nodes have long-term relations with the network. The post-paid 
payment policy has been widely used in many services successfully such as credit cards and 
cellular networks. In ESIP, each node needs a certificate to participate in the network. Issuing 
a certificate is not free to make changing identity costly. Moreover, similar to the existing 
single hop cellular networks, Tp stores the personal information of the users, and thus it can 
take the legal procedures against the users who do not pay. To limit overspending, a node’s 
certificate lifetime is short and the lifetime can depend on the node’s available credits at the 
certificate issuing time and its average credit consumption rate. We can also mix both the 
pre-paid and the post-paid payment policies to reduce the debt amount, e.g., each node has to 
 
 79 
pay some money in advance at certificate renewal. 
Without proper charging and rewarding policy, the rational attackers may try to cheat to 
increase their welfare. Our charging and rewarding policy has been developed to counteract 
the rational cheating actions and encourage the nodes’ cooperation. Particularly, a rational 
node can exhibit one of the following actions:   
1. If the intermediate nodes are rewarded for relaying the messages that do not reach 
the destination node [34, 35], the colluding nodes can drop a message and relay only 
the smaller-size security tag (hash chains’ elements) that is much shorter than the 
message to claim the payment for relaying the message with consuming low 
resources because they can compose a valid Evidence. Our payment model 
encourages the nodes to rely the messages because they are rewarded only when the 
destination node acknowledges receiving the messages. Moreover, the attackers’ 
trust values degrade when they drop a packet. 
2. If the source and the destination nodes are charged only for the successfully 
delivered messages, the destination node may receive a message but does not send 
ACK so as not to pay, or an intermediate node colludes with the source and the 
destination nodes to claim that the message does not reach the destination to 
increase their welfare. To thwart this cheating action, both the source and the 
destination nodes are charged for the un-delivered messages. 
Although the charges are always more than or equal to the rewards, our payment model 
does not make credits disappear because purchasing credits with real money can compensate 
the credit loss. The rich nodes that have much more credits than their credit consumption 
may stop cooperation to save their resources. Tp converts credits to real money to motivate 
these nodes to cooperate because this conversion reduces the nodes’ credits. Due to using 
post-paid payment policy, the nodes can communicate even if they do not have sufficient 
credits at the communication time.  
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6.1.2  Defence against Trust Manipulation and Irrational Packet Drop 
The objectives of using trust in route selection are as follows: (1) To foster trust among 
the nodes by making knowledge about the nodes’ past behaviors available; (2) To encourage 
the nodes to provide high packet-relay success ratios and tell the truth about their residual 
energy by giving more preference to the highly trusted nodes in route selection; and (3) To 
punish the nodes that provide low packet-relay success ratios because any loss of trust means 
loss of potential earnings. Our trust/reputation system can precisely judge the nodes’ 
behaviors because it can monitor the nodes’ behaviors over different sessions and long time, 
but the reputation-based mechanisms [14, 43-47] may not have sufficient time to judge the 
nodes’ real behavior as the period of interaction with any node may be brief due to the nodes’ 
mobility. Moreover, the nodes are motivated not to cooperate in reputation-based 
mechanisms because packet relay consumes their resource without benefits, but packet-relay 
is beneficial for the nodes in our protocol to earn credits. Reputation-based mechanisms use 
thresholds to differentiate between the honest and the malicious nodes, but in our protocol, 
once a node’s trust values fall behind those of the majority of the nodes, the node almost does 
not participate in routing without the need for determining accurate thresholds.  
Reputation and trust systems are susceptible to collusion attacks due to the nature of 
these systems, e.g., the colluding nodes may fill up an honest node’s rating window with 
negative ratings to evict the node from the network, and fill up their rating windows with 
positive ratings to avoid eviction. In our trust system, the singular attackers cannot launch the 
Trust-Boost attacks. For False-Accusation attack, the attacker has to neighbour the victim 
node and break the session intentionally to let Tp accuse its neighbour. First, neighbouring a 
node is not easy due to the nodes’ mobility. Second, the attacker is also accused of breaking 
the session and receives negative rating, which may discourage the attack. Third, frequently 
launching the attack reduces its effectiveness because the attacker will be less frequently 
selected in routes due to its low trust. Frequently launching False-Accusation attack also 
reduces the attack’s effectiveness in WRT because the honest nodes and the attackers are 
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offered less and more negative ratings, respectively. Finally, falsely accusing a node does not 
guarantee that this accusation will be effective because the node can filter out its negative 
ratings and improve its trust from other sessions.  
The impact of small-scale collusion attacks can be mitigated by categorizing ratings by 
identities. The reputation system can construct neighbour density tables (NDTs) for the 
negative and positive ratings in the rating windows. The negative rating density of node B in 
the NDT of node A is the number of negative ratings that B was neighbour to A to the total 
number of negative ratings in the rating window of A. By the same way, the positive rating 
density of node B in the NDT of node A is the number of positive ratings that B was 
neighbour to A to the total number of positive ratings in the rating window of A. In other 
words, the NDT can show the frequency that B caused positive and negative ratings to A. 
Obviously, in small-scale collusion attacks, the colluders have much higher densities than 
those of other nodes. Investigating the NDT for deciding a node’s state can improve the 
reputation system’s robustness. For example, in Reputation-Boost and False-Accusation 
attacks, few nodes have high densities in a node’s positive and negative ratings, respectively, 
and the node’s reputation becomes bad and good with excluding these false ratings, 
respectively. The NDT can prevent a small number of colluders from falsely improving their 
reputation values or evicting an innocent node from the network, and thus forces the 
attackers to collude with a large number of nodes, which is not easy in civilian and large-
scale networks [54], [55]. Certainly, if the NDT’s densities are flat or dominated by a large 
number of nodes, the reputation system can have a strong belief about the node’s real 
behaviour.  
Several measures can be taken to improve the robustness against large-scale collusion 
attacks. Clearance fee can be imposed to clear a session’s payment to discourage submitting 
reports for fake complete sessions to launch Trust-Boost attack, i.e., to make fabricating 
sessions by the colluding nodes to boost their trust values expensive. If colluders tamper their 
payment reports to accuse a victim, they lose credits and defame their reputation such as 
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Sessions 4 to 6 in Table 4.3. Although the honest nodes may receive negative ratings when 
they neighbour malicious nodes, the neighbours change due to the nodes’ mobility, which 
can distribute the negative ratings instead of concentrating them on few nodes. Moreover, 
since dropping the RREQ packets is not abuse, an honest node can protect its reputation by 
not involving itself in sessions with the neighbours that frequently drop packets. 
Equation 6.1 gives the probability that a node receives at least a ratio of Rm negative 
ratings in γ sessions, i.e., the probability of identifying a node as malicious, where P is the 
probability of receiving a negative rating in a session. Obviously, P should be much larger 
for the malicious nodes than the honest nodes because they break the sessions more 
frequently. Figure 6.1 shows that if Rm is chosen in the range [0.35, 0.55], the reputation 
system can perfectly differentiate between the malicious and the honest nodes. However, if 
Rm is low, e.g. [0, 0.35), some honest nodes may be falsely identified as malicious, and if Rm 
is too tolerant, e.g. (0.55, 1], some malicious nodes may not be identified. Thus, Rm can 
control the tradeoff between the false accusation probability and the malicious nodes’ 
detection probability. The increase of P increases Pi(γ) for the same Rm, and thus some honest 
nodes may be falsely identified as malicious if Rm does not have enough tolerance.  
P?(γ) = j kl · P · (1 − P)A.Y                                                                                      (6.1)   
 




Figure  6.2: The effect of γ on the reputation system’s effectiveness. 
 
Figure  6.3: The effect of P on Pi(X) for Rm of 0.5. 
From Figure 6.2, the honest and the malicious nodes can be identified more precisely 
with increasing the rating window size (γ) because Pi(γ) is less for the honest nodes and more 
for the malicious nodes, which can reduce the number of honest nodes that falsely identified 
as malicious and the number of malicious nodes that are not detected. For example, if Rm is 
in the range [0.3, 0.7], some honest nodes may be falsely identified as malicious and some 
malicious nodes may not be detected when γ = 10, but the reputation system can perfectly 
identify the nodes’ behaviours when γ is 100 or 250. From Figure 6.3, the aggressive 
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attackers that break a large percentage of the sessions, i.e., having large P, can be identified 
after they participate in a low number of sessions (or in shorter time). For example, the 
probabilities to identify the malicious nodes after participating in 20 sessions are 0.87, 0.92, 
and 0.96 for P of 0.6, 0.63, and 0.66 respectively. 
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of identifying the malicious nodes, a network 
simulator is programmed using MATLAB. 35 mobile nodes with 125 m radio transmission 
range are randomly deployed in a square cell of 1000 m by 1000 m. We adopt the modified 
random waypoint model [72] to emulate the nodes’ mobility. Specifically, a node travels 
towards a random destination uniformly selected within the network field; upon reaching the 
destination, it pauses for some time; and the process repeats itself afterwards. The node’s 
speed is uniformly distributed in the range [0, 10] m/s and the pause time is 10 s. The 
constant-bit-rate traffic source is implemented in each node as an application layer, and the 
source and destination pairs are chosen randomly. The DSR routing protocol [66] is 
simulated over an ideal channel, i.e., all the nodes within a transmission range receive the 
packets correctly. MATLAB is used instead of NS2 because the intention is to compare 
between the SRT and WRT. The effect of the un-simulated models such as non-ideal 
channel, channel contention, node buffer, etc, should be the same on the two techniques. 
Moreover, the reputation system’s thresholds can be adjusted to absorb the expected increase 
of the negative ratings with considering the effect of the un-simulated models. 300 sessions 
are held in each updating time, packet transmission rate is 0.5 packets/s, and 25 packets are 
transmitted in each session. A new route is established when the session route is broken. The 
parameters Rh, ω, β, γ, and α are 0.19, 100, 100, 50, and 0.78, respectively. The initial rating 
window is the repeat of ‘00001’, and thus the nodes’ initial reputation values and states are 
0.2 and honest. 
In Table 6.1, the number of false-positive nodes is the average number of the honest 
nodes that are falsely identified as malicious, and the detection time is the average updating 
times for identifying all the irrational packet droppers. Attack strength 1:X means that the 
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attackers break one session intentionally and behave normally for X-1 sessions. However, in 
order to launch effective attacks, the attacker has to break a large percentage of the sessions, 
i.e., X should be small. When X = 1, the attackers launch Black-Hole attacks by dropping all 
the packets they should relay, otherwise they launch Gray-Hole attacks. The simulation 
results demonstrate that Rm can control the tradeoff between the detection time and the 
number of false-positive nodes. Less tolerance to the negative ratings (Rm = 0.35) shortens 
the detection time but increases the number of false-positive nodes. This tradeoff is sharper 
in SRT because the honest nodes collect more negative ratings. It takes longer to identify the 
nodes that misbehave less frequently such as the nodes with 1:2 attacking strength because 
they lose their reputations slowly, but they also harm the network less. The increase of the 
attackers’ ratio increases the number of false-positive nodes because the honest nodes collect 
more negative ratings due to neighboring more malicious nodes, and the victims could not 
improve their reputation values with the same rate they degrade. Nevertheless, for Rm = 0.35 
and X = 1, when a large ratio of 42.86% (16 nodes) of the nodes behave maliciously, almost 
no node is falsely accused in the WRT but around 13.25 nodes (37.8%) are falsely accused in 
the SRT. That is because the honest nodes receive less negative ratings in WRT, i.e., the 
WRT can prevent the malicious nodes from degrading the honest nodes’ reputations and can 
better filter out the honest nodes’ negative ratings.  







(in updating times) 
False-positive 
nodes’ number 
(γ = 50) 
False-positive 
nodes’ number 
(γ = 15) 
SRT WRT SRT WRT SRT WRT 
1:1 
0.35 
5% 1 1.85 2.8 0 8.85 0.16 
42.86% 1.9 4.4 13.35 0.1 16.17 0.56 
0.6 
5% 2.25 14 0 0 0.9 0 
42.86% 5.3 98 0.85 0 2.85 0 
1:2 
0.35 
5% 1.15 10.95 3.6 0 11.35 0.72 
42.86% 2 23.65 10 0 12.6 2.24 
0.6 
5% 38.8 102.85 0 0 1.75 0 
42.86% 95.75 109.8 0.2 0 5.95 0 
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The number of false-positive nodes can be reduced in the SRT by increasing Rm, e.g., 
for X = 1 and 42.86% of the nodes are malicious, increasing Rm from 0.35 to 0.6 reduces the 
number of false-positive nodes from 13.35 (37.8%) to 2.8 (8%). However, the increase of Rm 
means that the smart attackers can break more sessions with keeping their reputation values 
above the system thresholds and the detection time increases. Rm can be less in the WRT, e.g., 
Rm = 0.35,  for small detection time and number of false-positive nodes because the malicious 
and honest nodes collect more and less negative ratings, respectively comparing with the 
SRT. Moreover, the simulation results demonstrate that the increase of the attackers’ ratio 
increases the detection time because some malicious nodes may not participate in sessions 
during an updating time and the malicious nodes receive less negative ratings due to 
neighboring more malicious nodes in the WRT. In addition, the number of false-positive 
nodes increases with reducing γ, which confirms the observation shown in Figure 6.2.  
Since the reputation system’s thresholds have direct impact on the system’s 
effectiveness, our centralized reputation system can compute the thresholds from the nodes’ 
reputation values and periodically tune them to improve the system’s effectiveness. For 
example, if most of the nodes’ reputation values are less than 0.3, Rh can be decided as 0.3 
assuming that the majority of the nodes behave honestly. Moreover, since the nodes contact 
the Tp over discrete times, the detection and eviction times can be reduced with issuing 
shorter-lifetime certificates to bad-reputation nodes. Investigating the reputation’s rate of 
change (dRLT,i(t)/dt) can reduce the detection time of some attackers, e.g., the reputation’s 
rate of change is higher for the Gray-Hole attackers than those of the honest nodes.  
6.2  Security Analysis for PRIPO 
6.2.1  Defence against Payment Manipulation 
The iterative encryption/decryption operations can protect against several attacks. First, 
removing the encryptions and verifying the correctness of the resulting packet implicitly 
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authenticates the intermediate nodes and ensures that the packet is relayed through the route 
it was supposed to take. Second, if Free-Riding attack is launched by the two colluding nodes 
A and C, the iterative encryption/decryption operations can thwart the attack because the data 
sent by A cannot be interpreted by C because it is encrypted (or decrypted) by at least one 
intermediate node. Third, the iterative encryption/decryption operations make the packets 
look different as they are relayed, which makes packet likability and tracing not possible, as 
we will discuss in subsection 6.2.2. For Packet-Replay attack, if an attacker replays the 
URREQ packet, he cannot establish the session because he cannot generate a fresh 
pseudonym or decrypt the UREST packet to get the key shared with his neighbour. In 
addition, since the source node encrypts a time stamp in the URREQ packet, the attacker 
cannot send valid packets without knowing a secret key because the packets are eventually 
dropped at the base station.  
Impersonation attack is not possible in PRIPO because the nodes have to authenticate 
themselves using the long-term keys shared with Tp in order to share a key with the base 
station. For Man-in-the-Middle attack, the attacker residing between a node and Tp may 
attempt to get the key shared between the node and the base station to communicate freely 
under the name of the node. PRIPO is not vulnerable to this attack because the shared key 
with the base station is encrypted with the node’s long-term key.  
To thwart the Destination-Node-Robbery attack, the intermediate nodes are rewarded 
only when the destination node acknowledges receiving correct data, and the session cannot 
be established if the destination node is not interested in the communication because it has to 
send the RREP packet. For Credit-Overspending attack, the nodes may spend more than the 
amount of credits they have. Most the existing incentive protocols are vulnerable to this 
attack because they use post-paid payment policy, i.e., the nodes communicate first and pay 
later. This attack cannot be launched in PRIPO because the base stations know the nodes’ 
total credits from Tp during the authentication phase, and thus they will not allow the node to 
overspend its credits. 
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The payment model can encourage the nodes’ cooperation and counteract cheating 
actions without submitting payment receipts or reports as follows:   
1. The nodes are motivated to relay the data packets because the nodes are rewarded only 
when the packets are delivered. 
2. Relaying the route establishment packets is beneficial for the nodes to participate in a 
session and thus earn credits. Relaying the ACK packets can trigger the source node to 
generate more packets and thus earn more credits. It is also beneficial for the downlink 
nodes because they are rewarded only when the ACK packets reach to Bd. 
3. If the nodes are charged only when the destination node receives a message, the node 
may claim that it does not receive the message in order not to pay. To prevent this, 
both S and D are charged for un-delivered messages. 
6.2.2  Defence against Privacy Violation 
Identity Privacy: The real identity is always kept confidential and never disclosed in 
clear. The nodes use pseudonyms in their communications to preserve identity privacy. A 
node’s pseudonyms cannot be linked to the real identity or to each other without knowing a 
secret key. Since pseudonym generation requires a lightweight hashing operation, a 
pseudonym can be used for a very short time to significantly improve the identity privacy. In 
AREQ, URREQ, and DRREQ packets, the real identities are concatenated with a varying part 
before encryption, e.g., in AREQ, IDX and KX are fixed but IDXTp is dynamic. This makes the 
packets look different at each time the node sends them, and thus even if an attacker could 
link a packet to a node, he cannot benefit from this conclusion in the future. In data transfer 
phase, if an attacker could link an onion data to a node, this will not help in the future 





The base stations know the real identities of the nodes in its cells but they do not know 
their long-term secret keys. PRIPO can easily be modified to hide the nodes’ real identities 
from base stations, but more overhead is encountered for contacting Tp to route the messages 
from Bs to Bd. PRIPO offers both sender and receiver anonymity as well as sender-receiver 
relationship anonymity. In PRIPO, S and D know the real identities of each other but they do 
not know the locations of each other. The intermediate and the eavesdropping nodes cannot 
learn the real identities of S and D and their locations in number of hops.  
Pseudonym De-synchronization: In Section 5.2, we have shown that the loss of 
pseudonym synchronization is difficult. However, if a node loses pseudonym 
synchronization with the base station for any reason, the node can re-synchronize by 
initiating a new authentication process. Since a node cannot change its pseudonym more than 
once before the base station changes its pseudonym to avoid synchronization loss, some 
nodes may use one pseudonym in the RREQ packets for a long time if they do not participate 
in a route. This may be specifically applied to the nodes at the network borders because they 
are less frequently selected by the routing protocol. The attackers may initiate RREQ packets 
to learn whether a node is still in its neighborhood. The proposed protocol for establishing 
the uplink route shown in Figure 5.4 can be used but for identity change request. The Pad can 
be a pre-defined value to inform the base station that the packet is for identity change. Bs 
replies with URREP packet containing a new pseudonym. 
Location Privacy: Padding is used to prevent the external and internal attackers from 
locating the source and the destination nodes from packet size. Moreover, the destination 
node relays the data and the route establishment packets to confuse its neighbors whether the 
node is intermediate or destination. Since UREST and DREST packets are relayed fixed TTL 
hops regardless of the location of the intended node, an attacker cannot know the locations of 
S and D. The attacker can know that he has a neighbor with a certain pseudonym but once 
the neighbor changes its pseudonym, it is difficult to know whether the new pseudonym is 
for the old neighbor or a new one.  
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Route Privacy: It is the capability of preventing the attackers from tracing a packet flow 
backward to its original source or forward to its final destination. The iterative 
encryption/decryption operations make the same packet appear quite different across links. 
Thus, the attackers overhearing the transmissions of two nodes in a route cannot recognize 
that the two nodes relay the same communication flow. Moreover, the base station can 
shuffle the received packets and relay them in a random order to prevent the attackers from 




























   
Chapter 7 
 Performance Evaluations 
In this section, simulation results are given to evaluate the overhead cost and the 
expected network performance of the proposed protocols. First, we evaluate the effect of 
replacing signatures with hashing operations. Second, we evaluate the reduction in the 
overhead due to using payment reports instead of receipts. Third, we evaluate the proposed 
trust-based and energy-aware routing protocols. Finally, the proposed privacy-preserving 
routing and incentive protocol is evaluated. 
7.1  Replacing Signatures with Hashing Operations 
7.1.1  Simulation Setup 
We use 1024-bit RSA and 1024-bit DSA with signature tags of 128 and 40 bytes, 
respectively, because the secure private keys should have at least 1024 bits according to 
NIST guidelines [73]. For the hash functions, we use MD5 and HMAC-MD5 [67] with digest 
length of 16 bytes and SHA-1 hash function with digest length of 20 bytes [67], [68]. For the 
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pairing operation, we consider the Tata pairing implementation on MNT curves where G is 
represented by 171 bits, and the order P is represented by 170 bits. The discrete logarithm in 
G is as hard as the discrete logarithm in Zp
*
 where P = 1024 bits.  Network simulator NS2 is 
used to implement ESIP and signature-based incentive protocols that use the public-key 
operations in each packet.  
We simulate multi-hop wireless network by randomly deploying 35 mobile nodes with 
125m radio transmission range in a square cell of 1000 m × 1000 m. The Distributed 
Coordination Function (DCF) of IEEE 802.11 is implemented as the medium access control 
(MAC) layer protocol. The transmission data rate is 2 Mbits/s. To emulate the node mobility, 
we adopt the modified random waypoint model [72] with speed and pause times uniformly 
distributed in the ranges [0, 10] m/s and [0, 50] s, respectively. Specifically, a node travels 
towards a random destination uniformly selected within the network field; upon reaching the 
destination, it pauses for some time; and the process repeats itself afterwards. The constant 
bit rate (CBR) traffic source is implemented in each node, and the source and destination 
pairs are randomly chosen. All the data packets are 512 bytes and sent at the rate of 2 
packets/s. The time stamp and an identity are five and four bytes, respectively. Each 
simulation is performed 50 runs, and each run is executed for 15 simulated minutes. The 
averaged results are presented with 95% confidence interval. 
In order to estimate the expected processing times of the cryptographic primitives, we 
have implemented the cryptographic primitives using Crypto++5 library [74] in a laptop with 
an Intel processor at 1.6 GHZ and 1 GB RAM. From Table 7.1, although the signature tags of 
the DSA signature scheme are shorter than that of the RSA, these schemes increase the end-
to-end delay significantly because the verifying operations performed by the intermediate 
and the destination nodes are computationally more demanding than the signing operations 
performed by the source node. Moreover, the energy consumption of the RSA and SHA-1 
operations are measured in [75], [76] and the results are given in Table 7.1. The resources of 
a real mobile node may be less than a laptop, so the results given in Table 7.1 are scaled with 
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the factor of the five in our simulations to estimate a limited-resource node.  
From Table 7.1, we can see that the computational times of the signing and verifying 
operations are sufficient for 539 and 18 512-byte hashing operations, respectively; and the 
consumed energy for the signing and verifying operations are sufficient for 1404 and 41 512-
byte hashing operations, respectively. In Table 7.2, statistics about the route length and the 
network connectivity in our simulated network are given. P(RL ≤ 4) is the probability that a 
route has at most four nodes including the source and destination nodes. The network 
connectivity is the ratio of the connected routes to the total number of possible routes 
assuming any two nodes are the source and destination pair. The statistics show that our 
simulated network is well connected and the route length is acceptable. 
Table  7.1: The processing times and energy of the used cryptographic tools. 
 Processing time (ms) Processing energy (mJ) 
1024-bit RSA 
Signing operation 15.63 546.5 
Verifying operation 0.53 15.97 
1024-bit DSA 
Signing operation 7.94 313.6 
Verifying operation 9.09 338.02 
Pairing operation 4.34 ms 25.5 
MD5 8.56 µs/512 bytes 0.302 
SHA-1 
16.79 Megabytes/s 
(29 µs/512 bytes) 
0.76 µ J/B 
Table  7.2: Statistics of the simulated network. 
Average network 
connectivity 
P(RL ≤ 4) P(4< RL ≤ 6) P(6 < RL ≤ 8) P(8 < RL ≤ 10) P(RL > 10) 
0.888 0.559 0.297 0.118 0.023 0.0041 
7.1.2  Simulation Results 
A. Average Packet Overhead 
We define the average security packet-overhead as the average security related data 
relayed in all the hops of a route. In Figure 7.1(a), the security packet-overhead of the 
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signature-based incentive protocols is due to fixed-size and route-length-independent 
signature, e.g., 40 and 128 bytes for DSA and RSA based protocols, respectively. However, 
in Figure 7.1(b), the security packet-overhead in ESIP is due to the 16-byte hash chain’s 
element (VS
X
) and the message hash series HS(MX) with η-byte truncated hash values at X > 
1. Figure 7.1(b) also shows that the security packet-overhead is reduced by η bytes in each 
hop because each node drops its hash value. Unlike the signature-based incentive protocols, 
the security packet-overhead of ESIP depend on the route length (RL).  
  
 
a) The hop-by-hop security packet-overhead in RSA/DSA based incentive protocols. 
 
b) The hop-by-hop security packet-overhead of ESIP. 
Figure  7.1: The hop-by-hop security packet-overhead of ESIP and signature-based incentive protocols. 
Figure 7.2 gives the relation between the average security packet-overhead and the route 
length for ESIP. The figure shows that even at unrealistic and extreme cases, e.g., RL = 20 
nodes, the average security packet-overhead is less than 55 bytes at η = 4 bytes. Figure 7.3 
gives the equivalent route lengths of signature-based incentive protocol and ESIP for the 
same average security packet-overhead at η = 4 bytes. For example, the routes with six nodes 
in DSA and RSA based protocols are equivalent to routes with 8 and 15 nodes in ESIP for the 
same average security packet-overhead, respectively. The figure shows that the average 
security packet-overhead of ESIP is less than that of the DSA and RSA based protocols when 
RL < 13 nodes and RL < 24 nodes at η = 4, respectively. Moreover, the security packet-
overhead of ESIP is less than that of the DSA based incentive protocol when RL is fewer than 
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17 and 10 nodes for η of 3 and 5 bytes, respectively. The security packet-overhead of ESIP is 
also less than that of the RSA based incentive protocols when RL is fewer than 75 and 45 
nodes for η of 3 and 5 bytes, respectively. Although the DSA has less signature size than 
RSA, it results in much more end-to-end packet delay due to its longer verification time, as 
we will discuss in Section 7.1.2-B.  
 
 
Figure  7.2: The average packet security-overhead in ESIP. 
 
Figure  7.3: The equivalent route lengths for the same security packet-overhead. 
Figure 7.4 shows the route length distribution at different number of nodes in the 
simulated network. At 15 nodes, the network is lightly connected because the average 
connectivity is 0.66. The network connectivity is measured by the number of connected 
routes to the total number of routes assuming any two nodes can be the source and 
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destination pair. As shown in Figure 7.4(a), 86% of the routes have four nodes or fewer, and 
only 0.0238% of the routes are longer than ten nodes. At 35 nodes, the average network 
connectivity is 0.99, the probability that a route is shorter than seven is 99.7%, and the 
probability that a route is longer than ten nodes is 0.0151%. At 50 nodes, the probability that 
a route is shorter than seven is 98.1%, and the probability that a route is longer than ten nodes 
is negligible. For dense network with 100 nodes, the probability that a route is shorter than 
seven is 99.99%, and the probability that a route is longer than ten nodes is negligible. Table 
7.3 gives the probability that a route is longer than 13 nodes (P(RL > 13)) at different network 
parameters. The conclusion of these results is that the route length is less than 13 nodes with 
very high probability under realistic network parameters, and thus the expected security 
packet-overhead of ESIP is less than those of the DSA and RSA based incentive protocols. 













Figure  7.4: Route length distribution. 
The average packet overhead is the average additional data (in bytes) attached to the 
d) At 100 nodes. 
c) At 50 nodes. 
b) At 35 nodes. a) At 15 nodes. 
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message including the routing and security data. Table 7.4 gives the average packet overhead 
in ESIP and signature-based incentive protocols. The packet overhead using RSA is much 
longer than DSA due to its longer signature. For the first packet, the average packet overhead 
of ESIP is more than that of the signature-based incentive protocol due to attaching the 
source node’s signature, VS
N
 and HS(M1). However, the packet overhead is less in the next 
packets because the source node does not attach signatures. The packet overhead of ESIP is 
1.34 and 1.13 times the overhead of DSA and RSA based incentive protocols, and for a series 
of two packets, the ratios become 0.98 and 0.68, so from the second packet, we gain the 
revenue of the investment in the first packet. Moreover, for a series of 10 packets, the data 
packet overhead in ESIP is 69% and 33% of that in the DSA and RSA based incentive 
protocols, respectively.  









Pr (RL > 13) 
800 X 800 
15 0.66 3.25 0 
30 0.97 3.66 0 
60 1 3.41 0 
1600 X 1600 
40 0.2235 3.6892 0.000444 
60 0.5394 5.5683 0.011 
100 0.9531 6.3174 0.0059 
2000 X 2000 
100 0.5591 7.4081 0.091 
150 0.948 7.7624 0.0539 
200 0.992 7.172 0.01225 
Table  7.4: The average data packet overhead (bytes).  
 RSA DSA 
Signature-based protocols 143 55 
ESIP 
First packet (X = 1) 161.73 73.73 
Subsequent packets (X > 1) 33.73 
B. Average End-to-End Packet Delay 
The required cryptographic operations for ESIP and signature-based incentive protocols 
 
 98 
are given in Table 7.5, where P, V, S, and H refer to pairing, verifying, signing, and hashing 
operations, respectively. It can be seen that ESIP requires more cryptographic operations in 
the first data packet, but ESIP requires only hashing operations from the second data packet. 
Table  7.5: The required cryptographic operations in ESIP and signature-based protocols. 
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Figure  7.5: The ratio of ESIP’s cryptographic delay to that of signature-based incentive protocols. 
Table  7.6: The average packet series size, and cryptographic time and energy ratios.  
Speed  
(m/s) 





















DSA RSA DSA RSA DSA RSA DSA RSA 
[0, 2] 
15 126.8 0.029 0.033 0.037 0.051 289.7 0.01 0.011 0.011 0.016 
35 134.15 0.015 0.018 0.019 0.027 258 0.012 0.015 0.015 0.022 
[0, 10] 
15 42.55 0.09 0.1 0.117 0.16 94.6 0.05 0.055 0.063 0.084 
35 40.425 0.098 0.11 0.13 0.173 95.4 0.05 0.056 0.064 0.088 
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The computation-time utility function is the required processing time for ESIP to those 
of the signature-based incentive protocols. For N messages, (2 ⋅ N) signatures are generated 
from the source and destination nodes in signature-based incentive protocols, but only two 
signatures are generated in ESIP. The time utility function versus the number of messages is 
shown in Figure 7.5. For the first packet and RL of 4, it can be seen that the time utility 
functions are 1.4 and 1.75 using DSA and RSA, respectively, and the ratios become 0.68 and 
0.88 for two packets. Moreover, for 13 packets, ESIP requires only 10% and 12% of the 
cryptographic delay in DSA and RSA based protocols, respectively. That is because the 
computation time of the hashing operations are negligible comparing to those of the signing 
and verifying operations, i.e., the time utility functions are the reciprocal of the packets’ 
number. In addition, the simulation results given in Table 7.6 demonstrates that under 
different network parameters, the average size of the packet series is greater than 13, and the 
cryptographic delay in ESIP is incomparable with those of DSA and RSA based incentive 
protocols. 
The average end-to-end packet delay refers to the average time that packets traverse the 
network from the source node to the destination node. The end-to-end packet delay is due to 
propagation, cryptographic, queuing, etc, delays. Figure 7.6 shows the average end-to-end 
packet delay in ESIP and the signature-based incentive protocols at different traffic load 
expressed in number of connections, and Table 7.7 gives the confidence intervals of Figure 
7.6(b). The simulation results demonstrate that ESIP can significantly reduce the average 
end-to-end packet delay comparing to the DSA and RSA based protocols because the hashing 
operations that are computationally free (43 µs per operation) dominate the nodes’ 
operations. Up to 20 connections, the cryptographic delay dominates the channel contention 
and queuing delays, but over 20 connections, the delay significantly increases with and 
without the incentive protocol because the channel contention and queuing delays dominate. 
Although the DSA has shorter signature than the RSA, it results in longer delay in the 
signature-based incentive protocols due to its longer verification time, but the DSA increases 
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the delay very little in ESIP because the effect of the long delay of the first packet vanishes 
with the dominant hashing operations. Hence, ESIP can be implemented more efficiently 
using DSA because it has shorter signature and the hashing operations can mitigate the long 












            a) Signature-based incentive protocols.                            b) ESIP and original DSR. 
Figure  7.6: The average end-to-end packet delay. 
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At high node mobility, Table 7.6 indicates that the average cryptographic delay 
increases, and Figure 7.7 shows that the end-to-end packet delay increases. That is because 
the size of the packet series decreases at high node mobility, and thus the effect of the heavy-
weight first packet increases. However, the simulation results demonstrate that the overhead 
of ESIP is still incomparable with those of the DSA and RSA based incentive protocols 
because only the free computation hashing operations are used after the first packet. 
 
 
Figure  7.7: The impact of mobility on the end-to-end packet delay. 
C. Packet Delivery Ratio 
The packet delivery ratio (PDR) refers to the average ratio of messages that successfully 
delivered to the destination nodes with respect to those generated by the source nodes. Figure 
7.8 gives the PDR for ESIP and the original DSR at different connections’ number, and Table 
7.7 gives the confidence intervals. Up to 20 connections, the PDR is quite high (above 98%). 
Above 20 connections, the PDR starts to decrease because more packets are dropped due to 
increasing the number of congested nodes and packet collision. Since each node has only 50-
packet queue size and increasing the connections’ number increases the packet arrival rate, 
the node is congested and drops the packets once the buffer is full. Moreover, increasing the 
cryptographic delay causes more congested nodes due to increasing the packet processing (or 
service) time. Comparing to the original DSR protocol, ESIP has a very little effect on the 
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PDR because the dominant hashing operations require very little computational time. 
 
 
Figure  7.8: The packet delivery ratio. 
 
Figure  7.9: The average throughput. 
D. Average Network Throughput 
The average network throughput is computed by dividing the size of the received data 
by all the nodes over the simulation time. Since the end-to-end packet delay and the PDR in 
ESIP are close to those of the DSR, it is expected that the throughput of ESIP is close to that 
of the DSR. The simulation results shown in Figure 7.9 demonstrate that ESIP has very little 
effect on the throughput comparing to the original DSR protocol. Up to 20 connections, the 
throughput increases with increasing the number of connections, but beyond 20 connections, 
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the increasing rate starts to decrease because the network reaches its capacity, i.e., above 20 
connections, the PDR decreases and the end-to-end packet delay increases as discussed in 










Figure  7.10: The ratio of ESIP’s cryptographic energy to that of the signature-based incentive protocol. 
E. Energy Consumption 
Energy is consumed in relaying the packets and executing the cryptographic operations. 
As discussed in Sections 7.1.2-A, ESIP can reduce the packet overhead with a very high 
probability. From Table 7.1, it can be seen that the consumed energy for the hashing 
operations is incomparable with those of the signing and verifying operations, which 
supports our approach of replacing the signature with the hashing operations. Figure 7.10 
gives the relation between the ratio of the required cryptographic energy in ESIP to that of 
the DSA and RSA based incentive protocols, and the number of data packets. At RL = 4, 
ESIP requires 1.025 and 1.175 of the consumed cryptographic energy for the DSA and RSA 
based incentive protocols, respectively for the first packet. However, from the second packet 
ESIP requires less cryptographic energy, e.g., for 10 packets, ESIP requires around 10% of 
the cryptographic energy consumed in the DSA and RSA based incentive protocols at RL = 4. 
In addition, the simulation results given in Table 7.6 demonstrate that the average 
 
 104 
cryptographic energy consumed in ESIP is incomparable with those consumed in the DSA 
and RSA based incentive protocols. 
7.2  Replacing Receipts with Payment Reports 
We simulate a MWN by randomly deploying 50 nodes with 150 m transmission range 
in a square cell of 1200 m × 1200 m. The constant bit-rate-traffic source is implemented in 
each node as an application layer, and the source and destination pairs are randomly chosen. 
To emulate the node mobility, we adopt the random waypoint model with a node speed 
uniformly distributed in the range [0, 5] m/s and pause time of 20 s. The data transmission 
rate is 0.5 packet per second. Ts, IDi, X are five, four, and two bytes, respectively. The 
simulation results are averaged over 400 runs. We simulate the DSR routing protocol over an 
ideal and contention-free channel, i.e., all the nodes within transmission range receive packet 
transmission correctly. MATLAB is used instead of NS2 because the intention is to compare 
the overhead of the payment reports to the receipts. The effect of the un-simulated models 
such as non-ideal channel, channel contention, etc, should be the same on the payment-
report-based and receipt-based protocols. For DSC [42], each node submits 69% of the 
receipts to guarantee submitting at least 95% of the receipts when there is no collusion. For 
PIS, the receipt submission probability is 0.2 to limit a colluder’s lifetime to 7 sessions. The 
hash chain size in DSC and ESIP is 100. 
7.2.1  Storage Overhead 
Using 1024-bit RSA signature scheme and SHA-1 hash function, the average size of 
receipt, evidence, and report are given in Table 7.8. The receipt size in Sprite is large due to 
attaching a signature from each end node. The receipt size of DSC and PIS and the Evidence 
size in ESIP are much smaller due to hashing the signatures. The receipt size of DSC is larger 
than that of PIS due to replacing the destination node’s signature with hashing operations and 
thus attaching the root and the last released hash value of the hash chain. ESIP’s Evidence 
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size is larger than the receipts in DSC and PIS due to replacing both the source and 
destination nodes’ signatures with hashing operations and thus attaching four hash values. 
For ESIP, DSC, and PIS, 1MB storage area can store up to 7289.9, 10098, and 16425 
receipts and evidences, respectively when one hash chain is used in DSC and ESIP. Hashing 
the nodes’ signatures can alleviate the effect of the long RSA signature tag.  
For ESIP, an Evidence size depends on the number of used hash chains (i) because two 
hash values are attached per hash chain. If the hash chain size is long enough, ESIP can 
generate one fixed-size Evidence per session. Table 7.9 gives the statistical distribution of the 
number of used hash chains. The simulation results demonstrate that more hash chains are 
used in low node mobility because more packets are transmitted before the route is broken. It 
can also be seen that the probability of using only one hash chain increases with the increase 
of Z. Properly choosing Z can reduce the number of used hash chains, which reduces the 
Evidence size and saves the destination node’s resources because the unused hash values in a 
chain should not be used for other sessions to secure the payment. A good Z depends on the 
average number of transmitted packets before the route is broken, which is related to the 
packet transmission rate, the node speed, and the expected number of transmitted packets in 
the session.  
Table  7.8: The average receipt, evidence, and payment report size (bytes). 
Receipt-based incentive protocols Payment-report-based incentive protocols 
Sprite ESIP DSC PIS Express report Evidence 
296.84 43.84 + 80 ⋅ i 63.84 + 40 ⋅ i 63.84 196 23.84 43.84 + 80 ⋅ i 
 
Table  7.9: The statistical distribution for the number of used hash chains.  
Smax Hash chain size (Z+1) P(i = 1) P(i = 2) P(i = 3) P(i > 3) 
3 m/s 
30 0.48 0.24 0.11 0.17 
50 0.6 0.28 0.12 0 
10 m/s 
30 0.89 0.11 0 0 




Figure  7.11: The effectiveness of the Evidence aggregation technique. 
 
Figure  7.12: The average storage area at different aggregation levels. 
Figure 7.11 shows the required Evidences’ storage area for 1000 Evidences and at 
different aggregation level (L) that means that the evidences are stored in 1000/L aggregated 
Evidences. The figure shows that the increase of L over 10 has little effect on the storage area 
but increases the number of redundant Evidences that are submitted. For example, if L is two, 
500 compact Evidences are composed and each one contains two individual evidences, so 
one redundant evidence is submitted if an Evidence is requested; and if L is 1000, all the 
individual Evidences are stored in one compact Evidence and thus 999 redundant Evidences 
are submitted if an Evidence is requested. In MWN, the nodes are equipped with limited 
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energy supplies and the network is characterized by limited bandwidth. The nodes delete the 
receipts after submission in the receipt-based incentive protocols, but they have to stores the 
Evidences for some time in ESIP. However, the storage area is not the main concern and the 
more important factors are the bandwidth and energy. Moreover, the capacities of the flash 
memories continue to rise as per Moore’s Law and their costs continue to plummet [77]. 
Figure 7.12 gives the relation between the number of Evidences and their average storage 
area at different number of individual Evidences which is aggregated in one compact 
evidence (or NE). Without Evidence aggregation, the Evidences occupy large storage area, 
and the storage area is minimized when all the Evidences are aggregated in one compact 
Evidence.  
7.2.2  Payment-Report Submission overhead 
From Table 7.9, ESIP requires submitting only payment report of 23.84 bytes per route. 
Evidences are submitted only in case of cheating in ESIP, but receipts are always submitted 
in the receipt-based incentive protocols. Table 7.10 gives the amount of payment data 
submitted to Tp for ten-minute data transmission at different node speed. During the 
transmission, a new route is established each time the route is broken. It can be seen that 
Sprite and Express generate a large number of receipts due to generating a receipt per data 
packet, and the increase of the packet transmission rate increases the number of receipts 
significantly due to increasing the number of transmitted packets. 
The simulation results indicate that Sprite requires submitting a large number of 
payment receipts due to generating a receipt per message. Moreover, the increase of the 
nodes’ speed increases the number of receipts because the receipts are generated for the un-
delivered packets. For DSC and ESIP, a new receipt or payment report is generated when a 
route is broken or Z messages are transmitted, but a new receipt is generated only when a 
route is broken in PIS. Table 7.10 indicates that more payment data are submitted at high 
node mobility because the routes are more frequently broken, i.e., the source node’s 
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messages are transmitted over a larger number of routes. ESIP requires submitting more 
payment data than PIS because only one node has to submit the receipt in PIS and the other 
intermediate nodes submit the receipt probabilistically, but all the nodes in a route have to 
submit payment reports in ESIP. However, PIS requires two signatures per packet, which 
consumes the nodes’ resources and increases the end-to-end delay.   
 
Table  7.10: The amount of submitted payment reports and receipts (KB).  
Protocol 
Node speed 
Sprite DSC PIS 
ESIP 
Payment report Evidence size 
[0, 5] m/s 192.19 2.11 0.56 0.74 4.44 
[0, 20] m/s 192.19 5.51 1.22 1.92 11.59 
7.2.3  Payment Processing Overhead 
Table 7.11 gives the payment processing overhead for a session held for ten minutes, 
where S, H, and V refer to signing, hashing, and verifying operations, respectively. The table 
indicates that ESIP does not need any cryptographic operations for clearing the payment in 
case of no cheating, and the Evidences are occasionally processed. The simulation results 
demonstrate that payment processing overhead in ESIP is incomparable with those of the 
receipt-based incentive protocols. 
 
Table  7.11: The payment processing operations for ten-minute session. 
 
[0, 5] m/s [0, 20] m/s 
S H V S H V 
Sprite 0 0 600 0 0 600 
DSC 15 307.5 0 39.2 319.6 0 
ESIP (fair reports) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ESIP (cheating reports) 2 X+1 0 2 X+1 0 
PIS 12.6 306.3 0 38.8 319.4 0 
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7.3  Evaluation of Trust-Based and Energy-Aware Routing  
Packet drop degrades the network performance significantly. The average throughput 
degrades by 16% to 32% if 10% to 40% of the nodes drop the network packets, and the end-
to-end packet delay increases linearly with increasing the attackers’ number [14], [15]. 
Moreover, since a new payment report and Evidence are generated when the session is 
broken and re-established, packet drop increases the payment overhead and exhausts the 
nodes’ resources in re-establishing the broken routes. Route breakage also wastes the end 
nodes’ credits because they pay for the un-delivered messages. In MWNs, a packet cannot 
reach to its destination if any intermediate node drops the packet, and thus the packet 
delivery ratio decreases with the increase of the number of packet droppers. Equation 7.1 
gives the probability of breaking a session with RL nodes (or n = RL-2 intermediate nodes) 
due to malicious action. Pm is the malicious nodes’ ratio, which is equivalent to the 
probability that an intermediate node is malicious. The packet delivery ratio for a route with 
RL nodes (PDR(RL)) is the number of data packets received by the destination node to the 
total number of packets sent in a route with RL nodes. In Equation 7.2, PDR(RL) and 
PDR0(RL) are the average packet delivery ratios with and without the existence of packet 
droppers, respectively for a route with RL nodes. Figure 7.13 shows that a low ratio of the 
packet droppers such as 20% can reduce the packet delivery ratio by 74% and 60% for 
sessions with eight and six nodes, respectively. Moreover, the increase of RL or Pm increases 
the session breakage probability and thus degrades the packet delivery ratio. 
Pn(R) = 1 − (1 − PY)A#                                                                             (7.1) 
PDR(R) = PDRS(R) · (1 − Pn(R))                                                                           (7.2) 
A route may be broken because of node failure, link failure, or node mobility. 
Establishing routes through stable links has been extensively studied and the proposed 
 
 110 
solutions can be integrated to our trust-based and energy aware routing protocol. Our routing 
protocols aim to reduce route breakage due to the node failure and mobility because a node’s 
trust values depict its failure probability and mobility level. A node’s trust value is low when 
it lies about its residual energy, fails frequently, has high mobility, or drops the messages 
intentionally. A trust value is a live and real measurement to the node’s mobility level and 




Figure  7.13: The expected drop of the PDR due to the packet droppers. 
In route establishment, the nodes in a route use signatures to authenticate themselves to 
thwart many attacks that can be launched by the external attackers [69] and also to secure 
ESIP by holding the nodes accountable for their actions. For example, the external attackers 
that are not members in the network may launch Resource-Exhaustion attacks by frequently 
flooding the network with RREQ packets to exhaust the nodes’ resources. In this 
authentication process, each node performs one signing operation and multiple verifying 
operations, and thus RSA signature scheme may be a proper choice because the verifying 
operations require much less computational time and energy than those of the signing 
operations, as indicated in Table 7.1. Moreover, dropping the data packets is more serious 
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than dropping the RREP packets because they are much longer, so the number of the public-
key-cryptographic operations and the payment overhead can be significantly reduced if ESIP 
aims to identify only the data packet droppers. In this case, the ISR(0) reports are not 
submitted, and the nodes can authenticate themselves in the RREP packets in order to reduce 
the number of the public-key-cryptographic operations because the RREQ packets are 
processed by a larger number of nodes.  
The SRT and WRT ratings are stored in one and seven bits, respectively, and thus a 
rating window for 320 ratings requires storage area of 40 and 280 bytes, respectively. 
Moreover, the storage area can be significantly reduced by making the size of the rating 
window dynamic. The rating windows can be short for the good-reputation nodes and long 
for the bad-reputation nodes, e.g., suspicious nodes, to better judge their behaviour.  
In our simulation, 70 nodes with 125 m transmission range are randomly deployed in 1000 
m by 1000 m. nL is the number of nodes having low trust values (T1,A(t)) that are uniformly 
distributed in [0.6, 0.995), but 70-nL is the number of nodes having high trust values (T1,A(t)) 
of 0.995. All the nodes start the simulation with initial energy that is sufficient for relaying 
100 messages. The given results are averaged over 30 simulation runs. In each run, 300 
communication sessions with randomly chosen source and destination pairs are established. 
The route is re-established if it is broken before sending 15 messages. The TTL is 10, and the 
source node’s energy and trust requirements in the SRR protocol are 5 and 0.88, respectively. 
We do not simulate node mobility because it is already included in the trust values, i.e., if 
T1,A(t) is 0.6, that means that node A drops the messages with the probability of 0.4. As we 
intend to study the effect of the node selection on the network performance but not the 
communication interface, our simulation is written in Matlab instead of NS2. 
The PDR is a good measurement for route stability. From Figure 7.14, our route-
establishment protocols outperform the dynamic source routing (DSR) protocol because 
unlike the DSR that randomly chooses the nodes, our protocols make informed routing 
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decisions. Thus, our protocols can establish more stable routes compared to the DSR. We can 
see that the increase of nL raises the chance of involving the low-trust nodes in routes in the 
DSR, but our protocols can avoid these nodes and select the high-trust nodes. Although the 
BAR outperforms the SRR in the PDR, the BAR has longer route establishment delay because 
the destination node has to wait to receive different routes.  
 
Figure  7.14: The packet delivery ratio VS nL. 
 
Figure  7.15: The number of broadcasts VS nL. 
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Figure 7.15 shows that the number of broadcasts in the DSR and the BAR does not 
depend on nL, but the increase of nL decreases the broadcasts’ number in the SRR because 
more nodes cannot satisfy the source nodes’ trust requirement, and thus they do not broadcast 
the RREQ packets. The BAR requires more broadcasts than the DSR because each node 
broadcasts the RREQ only once in the DSR, but some nodes may broadcast a RREQ packet 
more than once in the BAR.  
In Figure 7.16, the network connectivity is the number of connected routes to the total 
number of route establishment trials. We can see that the network connectivity in the DSR and 
BAR does not depend on nL, but the increase of nL decreases the network connectivity in SRR 
because more nodes cannot satisfy the source node’s requirements and thus more routes 
cannot be established. SRR protocol may not establish a route if the source node’s 
requirements are not adequately determined. In order to increase the probability of 
establishing a route successfully, the source node can periodically tune its requirements by 




Figure  7.16: The network connectivity VS nL. 
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7.4  PRIPO Evaluation  
7.4.1  Cryptographic Overhead 
To evaluate the computational times of the cryptographic operations used in PRIPO, we 
have implemented AES symmetric key cryptosystem and SHA-1 (160 bit) hash function 
using Crypto++ library [74]. The secure key size is at least 128 bits according to NIST [73]. 
The mobile node is a laptop with an Intel processor at 1.6 GHZ (CPU) and 1.00 GB Ram, 
and Windows XP operating system. The results demonstrate that a hashing operation requires 
16.79 Megabytes/s and encryption and decryption operations require 9.66 Megabytes/s. these 
results are scaled by the factor of ten to emulate a limited resource node. For the energy 
consumption, it is shown in [75] that a hashing operation requires 0.76 µJ/byte and 
encryption and decryption operations require 1.21 µJ/byte. 
7.4.2  Communication Overhead 
PRIPO was simulated using a network simulator written in MATLAB. 35 mobile nodes 
are randomly deployed in a square cell of 1000 m × 1000 m, and a base station is located at 
the center. The radio transmission range of the mobile nodes and the base station is 125 m. 
The random waypoint model is used to emulate the node mobility. The node speed is 
uniformly distributed in the range [0, 3] m/s and the pause time is 20 s. The constant bit rate 
traffic source is implemented in each node as an application layer. The source and destination 
pairs are randomly selected. The packets are sent at the rate of 2 packets/s. Distributed 
Coordination Function (DCF) of IEEE 802.11 is simulated as a medium access control 
(MAC) layer protocol. Our simulation is executed for 15 minutes and the results represent 
the average of 50 runs. The pseudonyms can be truncated into shorter length without 
significantly increasing the probability of pseudonym collision. The length of the truncated 
pseudonym (δ) depends on the cell size and the number of nodes in the cell. δ can be 
frequently computed by the base station and broadcasted. The length of δ, Pad, time stamp, 
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real identity, and MC are 10, 2 ⋅ δ, 5, 4, and 512 bytes, respectively. 
The simulation results given in Table 7.12 indicate that the expected delay is acceptable 
due to using lightweight cryptographic operations. The average length of the URREQ packet 
is computed by dividing the amount of relayed data in all links by the number of links. The 
simulation results show that only 24-byte packet overhead are added to each message.   
 
Table  7.12: Simulation results. 
 URREQ RREP DREST Data Packet 
Avg. packet length (bytes) 73.68 95.31 170.27 534 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions and Future Work 
In this chapter, we conclude this thesis and discuss our future work.  
8.1  Conclusions 
In this thesis, we first have proposed a fair, efficient, and secure cooperation incentive 
protocol for MWNs. The payment model has been developed to implement micropayment 
efficiently in MWNs to stimulate the nodes’ cooperation. Our protocol adopts a fair charging 
policy by charging both the source and destination nodes when both of them benefit from the 
communication. For efficient implementation, the proposed incentive protocol limitedly uses 
the heavy-weight public key cryptography. Instead of generating two signatures from the 
source and destination nodes to secure the payment, the public-key cryptographic operations 
are required only for the first packet, and they are replaced with the efficient hashing 
operations in the next packets. Therefore, for a series of packets, the heavy-weight overhead 
of the first packet vanishes and the overall overhead converges to that of the lightweight 
hashing operations.  
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Moreover, the communication sessions may occur without involving a trusted party. The 
nodes in a session have to submit the payment data to Tp. Reducing the overhead of the 
payment data is essential for the practical implementation of an incentive protocol due to the 
high frequency of low-value transactions. In order to reduce the overhead of submitting and 
processing the payment data, our protocol is receipt-free. The nodes submit lightweight 
payment reports containing their alleged charges and rewards for different sessions, and store 
undeniable security Evidences. A security mechanism has been proposed to identify the fair 
and the cheating reports. The fair reports can be processed with almost no processing 
overhead and with acceptable delay. For the cheating reports, the security mechanism 
requests the Evidences to identify and evict the cheating nodes. In order to reduce the 
evidences’ storage area, the nodes’ signatures are hashed instead of storing the long-size 
signatures. In addition, an Evidence aggregation technique has been proposed to reduce the 
Evidence storage area by generating a smaller-size compact Evidence for multiple sessions 
instead of Evidence per session. On the other hand, sessions may be broken normally, e.g., 
due to mobility, or intentionally due to malicious actions. We have proposed a novel 
trust/reputation system to measure the nodes’ packet drop rate by processing the payment 
reports. The reputation values are used to identify and evict the malicious nodes that 
intentionally drop the packets. SRT and WRT techniques have been proposed to calculate the 
nodes’ reputation values. SRT offers equal negative ratings to the two nodes in a broken link, 
but WRT offers more negative rating to the low-reputation node that dropped more packets in 
the past.  
We also have proposed a trust system to measure the nodes’ packet-relay probability. 
The nodes’ trust values are attached to their certificates to integrate the nodes’ past behaviour 
in the routing decision-making. We have proposed trust-based and energy-aware route-
establishment protocols called SRR and BAR to route the packets through the highly trusted 
nodes having sufficient energy to minimize the route breakage probability. Our protocols can 
make intelligent routing decisions based on the nodes’ past behaviour and residual energy. 
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The protocols stimulate the nodes not only to cooperate but also to provide high packet-relay 
ratio.  
Our security analysis and performance evaluations demonstrate that our incentive 
protocol can secure the payment with very low overhead because the hashing operations 
dominate the nodes’ operations. For a series of two packets, our incentive protocol has lower 
cryptographic delay and energy than DSA and RSA based protocols, and for a series of 13 
packets, the protocol requires around 10% of the cryptographic delay and energy of the DSA 
and the RSA based incentive protocols. Moreover, the packet overhead is less than that of the 
DSA and RSA based protocols with very high probability, e.g., for a series of 10 packets, the 
data packet overhead of our protocol is 70% and 37% of those of the DSA and the RSA 
based protocol, respectively. Our analysis and simulations also demonstrate that the payment 
can be cleared with almost no processing overhead and submitting lightweight payment 
reports while achieving the same security strength as the receipt-based incentive protocols. 
The simulation results demonstrate that the Evidences can be stored in a compact storage 
area.  
Moreover, WRT technique can precisely identify the irrational packet droppers with 
negligible false positive ratio because the honest and the malicious nodes receive less and 
more negative ratings, respectively. The reputation system is secure against small-scale 
irrational collusion attacks and robust against large-scale collusion attacks because the 
attackers lose credits and defame their reputations with launching these attacks. The 
simulation results demonstrate that our route establishment protocol can establish stable 
routes due to directing the traffic through the highly trusted nodes having sufficient energy, 
which can significantly improve the packet delivery ratio. 
Finally, we have proposed a privacy-preserving routing and incentive protocol for 
hybrid ad hoc wireless network. Micropayment is used to stimulate the nodes’ cooperation 
without submitting payment receipts or reports. Our protocol can achieve a high protection 
level for user privacy using lightweight cryptographic tools. For efficient generation of 
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pseudonyms, only the lightweight hashing operations are required. Extensive evaluations and 
simulations demonstrate that the node cooperation and the user privacy preservation can be 
securely and efficiently integrated in one protocol.  
In summary, the thesis proposes a novel protocol for thwarting the Packet-Drop attack, 
enforcing fairness, discouraging the Resource-Exhaustion attack, and routing the packets 
through the highly trusted nodes having sufficient energy to minimize the session breakage 
probability and thus maximize the packet delivery ratio. The thesis also proposes an efficient 
protocol for stimulating the node cooperation and user privacy.  
8.2  Future Work 
Delay tolerant wireless networks (DTNs) [78-82] are an emerging class of networks 
characterized by long packet delivery delay and lack of fully connected path between the 
source and destination nodes. Consequently, packet transmission follows a store-carry-and-
forward approach where the mobile nodes acting as packet relays buffer in-transit packets 
until the next node in the path appears, and so on, until the packets reach their destinations. 
Many useful applications have been developed for DTNs. Pocket-switched DTNs take 
advantage of the increasing popularity of the mobile devices equipped with wireless network 
interfaces to enable a new class of social networking applications. DTNs can be readily 
deployed at low cost in developing or remote areas. Vehicular DTNs can be used for 
disseminating safety and location-dependent information. For mobile sensor DTNs, sensors 
are attached to the nodes, e.g., vehicles, to monitor environment and state of roads, e.g., 
potholes and black ice. However, the practical implementation of DTNs is questionable 
because the networks’ unique characteristics have made them vulnerable to serious security 
threats. 
The selfish nodes drop other nodes’ packets because packet relay consumes their 
resources without any benefits, and the irrational attackers such as compromised or 
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malfunctioned nodes launch Denial-of-Service attacks by dropping the packets. Other 
attackers may analyze the network traffics to detect the users’ activities and locations. These 
attacks are severe threat to the network proper operation and users’ privacy. The presence of 
even a small number of attackers results in repeatedly dropped packets, which may cause 
network failure. In the traditional MWNs, the cooperation incentive protocols have been used 
for thwarting selfishness attacks. The nodes usually submit payment receipts, proofs of 
packet relay, to a trusted party to charge the source and destination nodes and reward the 
intermediate nodes credits. However, the protocols designed for MWNs cannot be used for 
DTNs because they require establishing end-to-end path before the data transmission occurs. 
Moreover, unlike MWNs that transmit one copy of each packet, multiple copies are 
transmitted in DTNs to enhance the packet-delivery probability, which makes the efficient 
implementation of the incentive protocols a real challenge [83]. Involving many nodes in 
packet transmission significantly increases the protocol overhead in terms of the number of 
receipts and cryptographic operations performed by the nodes.  
In addition, in MWNs, an intermediate node is supposed to transmit a packet once 
receiving it, and thus each node can monitor the transmissions of the successor node in the 
path to evaluate the node’s trust value (or packet-relay probability). The trust values are used 
to identify the irrational packet droppers and direct the traffic through the highly trusted 
nodes to maximize the packet-delivery probability. However, the unique “store-carry-and-
forward” packet transmission approach makes using this monitoring technique not possible 
in DTNs.  
In our future research, we will first investigate the efficient and secure implementation 
of cooperation incentive protocol in DTNs. In this thesis, we have proposed novel 
approaches for efficiently implementing an incentive protocol in MWNs, which will help us 
to devise new approaches for DTNs with considering their unique characteristics. Second, we 
will study designing a trust system to evaluate the nodes’ trust values. In this thesis, we have 
proposed a novel trust-evaluation approach for MWNs based on processing the incentive 
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protocol’s payment reports, but applying this approach for DTNs is a challenge, e.g., due to 
the multi-copy packet transmission. Third, we will design a routing protocol to direct the 
packets through the highly trusted nodes to maximize the packet-delivery probability. 
Finally, we will investigate using privacy-preserving techniques such as mixers, onion 
routing and pseudonyms [84-88] to enhance the users’ privacy. Integrating these techniques 
with our trust-based routing and incentive protocols with considering the DTNs’ 
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